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SYNOPSIS
The Study of Implementation has been one of the most obscure 
aspects of planning, partly because of the lack of documentation and 
analysis of the processes which it is characterised by and partly 
because of the complexity and mercurial nature of such processes in 
practise.
This reseach has centred around the examination of implementation 
in the planning process by focusing attention on a particular place 
through a particular period of time. The place is Maryhill and the 
time period is the duration of the Maryhill Corridor Project (1978-84).
The thesis is structured on an analysis of alternative views of 
implementation within a theoretical context where the conventional 
wisdom of the separation of policy and planning from its 
implementation is contrasted with an "action-oriented" approach.
The issues which the discussion raises provides the backcloth against 
which the in-depth empirical research of the case study material 
is presented. This is followed by an evaluation of the factors 
and processes which have been seen to be significant in influencing 
implementation.
The analysis is fundamentally based on a critique of the 
rational-comprehensive conceptualisation of the planning process.
Finally, the thesis returns to an assessment of how the 
theoretical understanding of the planning process relates to the 
processes which have been identified in reality.
It is at the interface of theory and practise to which this 
research is directed, where the study of implementation becomes 
most significant and where the coming together of different 
actors and agencies plays a central part.
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1CHAPTER 1 
PLANNING THEORY AND IMPLEMENTATION
Planning as an activity and as a profession, since the early 
1970’s, has been the subject of a strong debate concerning questions 
of its altruistic purpose and its inequitable distributive 
consequences. A more emotive attack on the planning profession has 
been the subject of many a radical critique (Glass 1959; Simmie 197*0 
as well as raising fundamental dilemmas over the utility of planning 
as a task in its own right (Friedmann 1973» Schon 1971)-
The apparent success of the post-war planning system 
(Cullingworth 1976; Hall 1982) was to meet with growing uncertainty 
through the 1970’s, particularly through a decline in economic 
growth and constraints on public expenditure and, more importantly, 
a political climate increasingly antagonistic to the planning 
system for not delivering the goods.
This apparent inability to get policy on the ground resulted 
in a re-evaluation of the planning system through various bodies 
including the Planning Advisory Group (1965), The Royal Town Planning 
Institute (1976; 1979), as well as by academics who were now 
emphasising the ’’crisis in planning” (Healey et al 1982) suggesting 
that a dangerous relapse into pragmatism was occurring.
However, the issues which have been raised are not confined 
to physical planning but include the whole area of bureaucratic 
organisation in public policy. Similarly, the ’’failure of planning” 
should not necessarily be seen as a failure 6f the planning system 
per se but rather in the ways it has been operated. Perhaps the 
most important debate has been over the limitations of the 
rational - comprehensive approach which has characterised planning 
since the post-war period, resulting in a need to look for other 
avenues of understanding. In the context of this thesis the most 
important avenue has been the emphasis on implementation and 
particularly on ’’action" within that arena.
The understanding that something has gone wrong, has been 
evidenced by the problems of coping with growing complexity in the 
field of planning and difficulties encountered in dealing with 
questions of uncertainity.
Implementation issues and processes have thus become 
increasingly important. It would appear, however, that more has 
been assumed about implementation than has actually been understood. 
This may partly be the result of the study of implementation of 
policy lacking "glamour". However, a policy is only as good as its 
implementation.
The study of policy implementation or the "outputs” of 
policy is concerned with the capacity of actors, agencies and 
institutions to deliver the intentions of policy, the difference 
between the two resulting in what Dunsire (1978) terms the 
"implementation gap”.
The dearth of implementation studies has been bridged by 
few writers amongst the most notable of which are Pressman and 
Wildavsky (1973).
"Attempts to plan are no more planning than 
the desire to be wise may be called wisdom or 
the wish to be rich entitles a man to be called 
wealthy. Promise must be dignified by 
performance. The determination of whether 
planning has taken place must rest on an 
assessment of whether and to what degree 
future control has been achieved ". (P 129)
The lack of study of implementation processes has posed 
difficulties in assembling material for analysis.
"Few questions have been asked about what 
the assumed implementation processes 
actually entail, what factors are likely 
to affect them, and how likely is a given 
proposal to improve them in practise".
(Prior 1985, p )
the implications of the above have therefore resulted in
"little or no consideration given to the 
complex chain of reciprocal interactions 
required to implement them". (Op Cit, p )
(a) THEORETICAL POSITIONS ON PLANNING
Much of the analysis of implementation is embedded within 
several theoretical frameworks which lie on a continuum from, at 
one end, the rational/comprehensive paradigm to models based on 
incrementalism and behavioural studies.
By analysing the rational/incremental continuum and the 
various methodologies deriving from it, the main features of the 
debate about factors influencing implementation may be highlighted.
(i) Rational/Procedural Planning
The basic dilemma which this approach highlights is the need 
for and access to relevant information and the examination 
of alternative strategies. Meyerson and Banfield (1955) 
adopted this approach in which rational, comprehensive 
planning is seen as a linear process of;
(1) listing all opportunities for action;
(2) identifying all consequences following 
from each possible action;
(3) selecting the action which would be followed 
by the preferred set of consequences;
(*+) monitoring the results (Banfield 1959)
There is a separation of policy from implementation 
such that the difficulties of implementation are based on 
inadequacies in the way in which programmes or policies are 
formulated. This raises a dilemma as to the importance of 
policy conformance (ie. the degree to which control can be 
exerted in order to ensure the execution of policy 
intentions) and policy performance (concentrating on the 
ability of "implementers" to act out policy.
A great deal of criticism has been levelled at the 
rational model for; (1) its apolitical assumptions; (2) its 
deterministic view of the policy - implementation process;
(3) the assumption of the availability of perfect knowledge;
(4) the logical, linear progression of decision-making; 
and (5) its emphasis on consensus to ensure implementation 
occurs in line with policy, leading Hambleton (1978(a)) to 
the conclusion that:
"Some of the drawbacks are that such a 
synoptic attempt at problem solving is 
beyond man's limited intellectual 
capacities, fails to recognise that 
information is either not available or 
available only at prohibitive cost, 
ignores the high cost of analysis and is 
ill-suited to the diverse forms in which 
policy problems actually arise. More 
fundamentally the process ignores the 
political realities of urban government 
for it assumes that agreement can be 
reached on the objectives to be pursued 
when these are the subject of continuing 
social conflict" (P 6).
Vickers (1976) nevertheless argues that the rules of the game 
must be established and that "rational analysis is not on 
this account useless. On the contrary it is essential".
This has led to a wider, looser definition of rationality 
which incorporates differences in values such that there is 
no one, best answer, rather that many, different rationalities 
exist - Faludi (1973, 19&2) admits the difficulties of 
bridging the gap between ideals and reality suggesting that it 
is only as a normative model that the rational/procedural 
approach has any relevance.
(ii) The Behavioural - Incrementalist Approach
Arising from studies of organisational behaviour and 
decision making, this approach has been furthered most by 
Lindblom through his "science of muddling through" or its 
more technical term "disjointed incrementaiism"
(Lindblom (1959))- Lindblom totally rejects the ideal of 
rational/comprehensive planning stating that the incrementalist 
approach postulates that goals can only, be partially achieved. 
Means and ends, unlike the rationalist approach, are not 
distinct and includes the assumptions that (1) administrators 
decide policy without clarifying objectives first; (2) 
circumstances play an important part in policy choices and
(3) the choice of policy combines values in different ways. 
Agreement on policy is seen as the only practical test of 
the policy's correctness achieved through mutual adjustment 
between those involved in decision-making. In this strategy 
implementation is seen as part of and not distinct from 
policy-making. However, criticisms have been laid at the 
approach for favouring the more powerful groups in a 
pluralist society and neglecting the importance of innovations 
with its short term focus (Faludi 1973)-
The approach has also been criticised for not relating 
to large scale fundamental decisions which has led Etzioni (1967)
to combine the rationalist/incrementalist approaches through 
the strategy of "mixed scanning" in which;
(1) high order, fundamental policy-making processes 
set the basic directions; and
(2) incremental processes prepare for fundamental 
decisions, and work them out after they have 
been reached.
(iii) The New Humanist Tradition
This approach is characterised by the writings of 
Friedmann (1973) and Schon (1971)- Basically the approach 
calls for normative planning where planners subject both 
means and ends to rational consideration ie. combining 
scientific analysis with reform and change. This approach, 
however, rejects the central control of rationalist thinking 
and the pragmatism of Lindblom.
There is a rejection of the bureaucratic model of 
organisation in which traditional planning has been moulded, 
stressing the cognitive limits of a central intelligence - 
Schon (1971) sees planning as a form of social learning 
occurring in small, temporary, non-hierarchical working 
groups involving inter-personal transactions in a reticular 
decision-making environment.
The widespread notion that plans ought to get accepted 
and then when they are not, failure is seen as that of 
society, rests on a technocratic fallacy that planning 
proposals are superior to the actions of others.
If the focus is shifted from decisions to actions it is 
possible to assert that any action that is deliberate is also 
planned and therefore the "problem is not how to make decisions 
more rational but how to improve the quality of the action
(Friedmann 1973, P 60).
The problem of "dynamic conservatism" (Schon 1971) in 
organisations ie. resistance to change, is seen as 
reinforcing itself through the interests, perceptions and 
values of the actors involved. This has led to an emphasis 
on the pathology of organisations as central to implementation 
problems.
Implementation cannot therefore be divorced from policy 
as this approach concentrates on those involved with policy 
and its implementation. The approach has much in common with 
advocacy planning in the United States and is utopian in its a 
priori l.need for changes in social attitudes.
(iv) Urban Managerialism
Three strands can be identified in the development of this 
thesis; (1) the systems approach to planning (McLoughlin 1973);
(2) urban sociology (Pahl 1970); and
(3) the growth of applied management techniques 
(Stewart 1971)*
By virtue of being able to affect other people's life 
chances because of the complexity of the industrial city 
Lambert (1970) argues that this places considerable power 
in the hands of bureaucratic officials in allocating scarce 
resources. This is fundamentally a top-down, elitist, 
hierarchical view of decision-making and implementation 
and as such this thesis has been attacked on similar grounds 
as the rationial model.
(v) The Political Economy Tradition
This approach has formed much of the criticism of the 
planning system and profession during the 1970's. It postulates
that particular social forms can only be comprehended through 
an analysis of their development through time and their 
relations with society as a whole. The particular context 
in this case is the capitalist mode of production. It views 
the planning system therefore as an instrument of capitalism 
which allows the latter to maintain the socio-legal system in 
the hands of the dominant clang.
Therefore town planning is not merely a form of 
"rational" behaviour applied to urban development but is part 
of the process of social transformation and class struggle.
There is an important emphasis on ideology by its supporters 
and its critics. Nevertheless, it opens up important 
questions on the role of the planner and the planning system 
in a "political" system. As of yet, however, it has little 
prescriptive value in determining the nature, role and scope of 
implementation process.
(b) Implementation Within Theory
The introduction of the different models on planning theory 
above, has been a necessary precursor since the different approaches 
on implementation which have emerged over the past two decades have 
used these models to describe the conceptual nature of implementation 
and its role within prescriptions for action.
Perhaps one of the most difficult questions about implementation 
is where it actually occurs ie. after policy is made, or whether 
it runs through the whole planning process such that the boundaries 
between policy and implementation become blurred. What is 
important here is what the segregation of policy from, or its 
integration with, implementation reveals about the conceptual 
biases of empirical or theoretical formulations about 
implementation (Prior 1985)- Ihe differing values and assumptions 
based on the theories outlined above therefore have important 
implications for the prescriptive value of implementation within a
theoretical context.
Two of the main exponents on implementation studies have been 
Pressman and WLldaVsky (1973)* In their study they emphasise the 
complex chain of reciprocal interactions which has to be bridged 
before even the "ordinary", day-to-day features of implementation 
can be achieved. They emphasise the importance of the multiplicity 
of decisions which increase inversely with the probability of 
programme success;
"When a programme depends on so many actors, 
there are numerous possibilities for 
disagreements and delay" (p 102).
Delay, in fact, is seen as a basic pathology of implementation 
processes. As well as this "failure" is attributed to;
(1) the inability to follow through programmes;
(2) conflicts of interest;
(3) administrative antagonisms within and 
between agencies; and
(k) poorly defined aims and intentions.
These features place the Pressman and Wildavsky methodology 
within the rationalist approach. The focus on organisation 
and policy design in order to minimise delay leads them to assert 
the need to;
"concentrate on those major decision points 
that determine the course of the programme 
or that had to be passed in order for the 
programme to continue" (op cit., p 102)
with the basic dichotomy being that;
"programmes can be delayed, modified,
scaled down and otherwise adapted or
distorted to fit their environment"
(op cit, p 110)
The sheer difficulty would be to determine which decisions were 
in the direction of the defined goals and which were unplanned 
diversions from the intended path. The behavioural analysis by 
Pressman and Wildavsky describes the need for greater co-ordination 
but accepts the tautology of co-ordination as a term for renaming 
the existing problems of implementation. Whilst accepting the need 
to make the difficulties of implementation part of the initial 
formulation of policy and thins drawing means and ends together 
criticism has been placed on Pressman and Wildavsky by Barret and 
Fudge (1981) for their assumption that policy-making and implementation 
proceed by a series of logical steps, and conceiving implementation 
as putting policy into effect.
For this reason the approach of Pressman and Wildavsky exhibits 
characteristics of the rational approach. Although Pressman and 
Wildavsky recognise that programmes can begin from intentions rather 
than pre-defined goals and that co-ordination depends on whose 
terras it is devised, they are not incorporated into their 
prescription for implementation processes. Hood (1976) and Dunsire 
(1978) have shown how difficult are the problems of organisational 
control even within unitary hierarchical organisations suggesting 
that difficulties will increase within multi-agency situations.
For Dunsire and Bardach (1977) the problem becomes one of control 
whilst accepting, with their emphasis on behavioural aspects, the 
role of key • individuals in the planning process.
Again, the focus is on creating the conditions and resources 
which can sustain a programme through the process of implementation 
to realise the initial goals. Bardach suggests that inherent 
problems of delay in the latter because of uncertainty and. the 
complexity and number of conflicts will serve to shift the intended 
path out of sequence. The prescription therefore becomes the 
design of simple, straightforward programmes.
(c) Implementation As Action
Barret and Fudge (1981) state that much of the literature on
policy and implementation takes a managerialist perspective 
with the problems of implementation seen in terms of co-ordination, 
control or obtaining compliance with policy. Such approaches, 
they assert, tend to play down issues of power relations, 
conflicting interests and value systems between individuals and 
agencies who make policy and those who put it into effect.
Their approach therefore concentrates on implementation as a 
politicial issue stating that;
"rather than treating implementation 
as the transmission of policy into 
a series of consequential actions, 
the policy-action relationship 
needs to be regarded as a process 
of interaction and negotiation, 
taking place over time, between 
those seeking to put policy 
into effect and those upon whom 
action depends" (Barret and Fudge p 23)
An emphasis is placed on the need for theories to take account of 
individuals and groups within institutional settings and focus 
attention on administrative structures, bureaucracy and the 
questions of accountability, power, professional "cultures" and 
the environmental setting. Hie latter represents the need for a 
behavioural approach concentrating on"action" within a plural 
social context. In this conception, the key issues in understanding 
implementation processes are considered to be;
(a) the multiplicity and complexity of interests 
involved .;
(b) questions of control and co-ordination; and
(c) issues of conflict and consensus.
This analysis takes policy as the starting point from which action
begins. Hill et al (1979) makes the qualification that not all 
action relates to a specific or explicit policy such that policy 
may be a response to action at a lower level since in many areas 
those on whom action depends are not in a hierarchical set-up.
Thus implementation is not just putting policy into effect 
but observing what actually happens and to understand how and why. 
From this implementation in the context of action may be seen as a 
series of responses; to ideology; environmental pressures; or from 
other groups within a setting of power relations. These responses 
operate as dynamic processes, changing over time.
This approach has much in common with Lindblom's 
incrementalism and theories of political and organisational 
behaviour, and with Etzioni’s "mixed scanning" attempting to find 
practical methodologies that utilise more behavioural explanations 
of the policy-making process. The need to locate such an approach 
within its social context draws on the structural nature of 
processes within the political economy tradition.
The multitude of forces involved in a pluralist society means 
that this approach contrasts significantly with the idealistic 
assumptions of the rationalist paradigm. The emphasis is on policy 
performance rather than policy conformance with negotiation , 
bargaining and compromise central concern.
From the above analysis, it can be seen that two contrasting 
(though not unrelated) methodologies have emerged from a concern 
with the complexity of and capability to respond to, 
implementation processes which hatye acted as a stimulus for 
developments in the prescriptive field.
The rational - procedural approach has developed through the 
analyses of Pressman and Wildavsky, Dunsire and the related areas 
of the Systems approach and cybernetics with an emphasis on creating 
organisation and management structures and processes to deal with 
the demands placed upon them. Sophisticated technologies
concentrating on technical controls (Dror 1963) are characteristic 
of ensuring policy conformance.
The incrementalist - behavioural -perspective places 
implementation within the political context responding to the dynamic 
environment of conflicting interests, values and power. Emphasis 
is therefore placed on policy performance in which policy and action 
become firmly linked. Since all planning processes are, by 
definition, rational, it would appear therefore that the criticisms 
of the rational approach have attempted to focus on a new 
ralionality. As such the recognition of the Rational - Incremental 
continuum is important with the rational-comprehensive approach 
emphasising a technical rationality while the behavioural models 
tend to exhibit a political rationality.
(d) Conclusions
The real problem centres on the conception of implementation, 
its relation to the environment and how it is treated as a result.
The pursuit of rational inquiry developed through the 20th century 
has been linked with objectivity and neutrality. This is evidenced 
in the rational comprehensive paradigm which has characterised 
planning over the past 35 years. Nevertheless the recurring 
dilemmas of this system since the post war period highlighted the 
inequitable rewards it delivered, resulting in conflicts of interest;
"These conflicts exposed the frailty of
the claim to objectivity on which
was founded the authority of
science and of the professions
which were expected to advance
knowledge and apply it" (Donnison 1975 P 1*+)
The emergence of behavioural/incremental and structural models, 
mainly as a response to the rational/procedural approach, placed 
a greater emphasis on political activity. The resultant plurality 
of perspections that hewe emerged have been characterised by
different perceptions, methodologies, ideologies and values have 
produced various interpretations of the concept of implementation.
(e) Issues for Implementation
The study of implementation therefore becomes problematic.
The poor level of understanding of and research into implementation 
processes is characteristic of this dilemma. For this thesis, 
however, what is important are the issues which the dilemma raises 
and which have an important bearing on the case material presented 
here. The main problem areas which have emerged can be described 
as;
(1) the nature and role of implementation in the planning 
and policy process;
(2) the nature of decision-making processes ie. linear 
or reticular;
(3) the role of individuals and groups and their 
perceptions; values and ideologies;
(*f) the relationship between policy-makers and 
implementers;
(5) the influence of political processes in planning 
and implementation; and
(6) the context of changing circumstances.
CHAPTER 2 
MARYHILL - THE BACKGROUND
From the conclusions reached in the last chapter it has been 
recognised that implementation processes are dynamic and influenced 
by the context within which they operate. It is thus essential to 
understand the circumstances leading up to the declaration of the 
Maryhill Corridor Project in order to show why the latter emerged 
and what changes needed to take place in order to achieve the desired 
aims.
This brief chapter and the next attempts to show the complexity 
of the processes of implementation and of the links between policy 
and implementation.
In order to simplify and aid discussion a "Table of Events" 
(Appendix 1) has been prepared which locates various events within 
the different streams of activity which have had an effect on the 
Maryhill Corridor Project. This is to be read in conjunction with 
the thesis. The table is divided into k columns entitled;
(1) Planning and Management (describing events in this 
field affecting local government in general);
(2) Maryhill (which describes events specific to this 
area);
(3) Politics (highlighting important political events 
at the local scale);
(*f) External (describing national, large-scale events 
and trends).
It is the interaction between these topic fields and their 
bearing on developments on the processes of implementation which 
are significant here.
(a) The Geography of Maryhill
The "Maryhill Corridor" was originally used to describe the
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proposed Motorway route which was to run the length of the main 
arterial route of Maryhill Road which bisects the project area 
(Plate 1)(Fig 1). The history of the proposed motorway and the 
subsequent changes which were to lead to its abandonment will be 
discussed in the next section suffice to say that the title Maryhill 
Corridor was to be retained for the eventual "Maryhill Corridor 
Project" which provides the subject matter for this thesis.
The area described as the Maryhill Corridor extends from 
Glasgow City Centre to the city boundary in the north-west, covering 
an area of nearly 2,500 acres. The area extends out in a sectoral 
fashion from the inner city in the southern end to the peripheral 
housing estate of Summerston in the north along the main Maryhill 
Road, finally running into the Argricultural and Green Belt.
The area is crossed by the River Kelvin which forms part of 
the western boundary of the Corridor boundary and by the Forth and 
Clyde Canal along which much of the traditional industrial activity 
of the area was and is located (Plate 2).
Population has steadily declined over the last 20 years, leaving 
the established population by 1977 at approximately **0,000.
There are also important variations within the area. In the 
south much of the Corridor lay derelict with the closure of many 
local businesses and demolition of high density tenemental properties. 
This produced many "gap" sites and larger tracts of vacant land.
The middle of the Corridor contains areas of inter-war and post-war 
housing and, where the original railway station was located, recent 
shopping developments attempting to regenerate commercial activity 
along the main route, Maryhill Road. In the north the construction 
of Summerston housing estate in the 1970*s contrasts with the older, 
southern part of the Corridor, exhibiting a more diversified tenure 
mix. This reflects significant variations in the age structure of 
the different communities in the area (Fig 2). Within these 
different territories exist many community groups, emphasising
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the parochial nature of much of the activity in the area.
(b) Background to the Corridor Pro.ject
Throughout the 1960*6 and early 1970's, different parts of the 
area referred to as the Maryhill Corridor were the subjects of 
local authority planning activity. The 1960 Quinquennial Review 
of development plans by Glasgow Corporation had designated Woodside 
in the south of the Corridor, as a Comprehensive Development Area 
(CDA) and created two further Outline CDA's in North Kelvinside 
and Maryhill (Fig 1). This was aimed at providing for the comprehen­
sive redevelopment of the area by ensuring that proposals for the
of particular sites were worked out in advance of any "slum 
clearance" activities. However, as with many of these projects 
during this era, they tended to be over-ambitious with much 
demolition but little development resulting in large areas of decay 
and dereliction within the Corridor.
On top of this a proposal in the Greater Glasgow Transportation 
Study (1965)» to build a Motorway running through the full length 
of the Corridor - one of the main reasons for adapting the label 
now being used for the area - created a blight on a number of areas. 
The Motorway gained further legitimacy because of the related Inner 
Ring Road proposed for the city onto which the Maryhill Motorway 
would feed (see Table of Events).
Central Government, by the late 1960's, was cutting back on 
capital expenditure on large scale projects which it subsidised 
and which resulted in uncertainty being placed on the Maryhill 
Motorway.
Significant changes were also taking place in other fields 
which were to have an important bearing on planning at this time.
The concern over the inflexibility of D e v e lo p m e n t Plans caused the 
Planning Advisory Group (PAG) Report to be produced in 1965 which 
became instrumental in the publication of the 1967 White Paper on 
Town and country Planning eventually resulting in the Town and
Country Planning Acts of 1968 (England and Wales) and 1969 (Scotland).
Hie reorganisation of local government which these Acts 
provided for, changed the traditional county council system to a two 
tier system which in Scotland (1975) resulted in the creation of 
Regional and District authorities as well as 3 all-purpose authorities 
who became responsible for producing structure and local plans. This 
would provide the "stage" when the new Strathclyde Regional Council 
and Glasgow District Council were formed and who would be the two 
tiers involved in the eventual Corridor Project. This important 
change from the all purpose Glasgow Corporation to the Strathclyde 
Region and Glasgow District was to lead to significant differences 
between the two; the District because of its important loss of 
functions and the Region as a wholly new creature attempting to 
find its feet in the new administrative arrangements.
Strathclyde Region, which had now taken on the transport 
function, became responsible for the motorway programme. However, 
there was continued public concern backed by local politicians over 
the blight that was being caused in the area. The growing 
uncertainties over capital funding, were eventually to lead to the 
Maryhill Motorway being deleted from the Regions "Strategic Highways 
Schemes" in 1976.
Another significant factor from the early 1970's which was to 
have an important effect on the Corridor Initiative was the increasing 
concern for the growing social and economic problems prevalent in 
the inner cities. Hie context within which these developments took 
place can be identified from the Table of Events:
(c) The Inner City Problem
The 1971 census revealed that the severest concentrations of 
those suffering the greatest social and economic distresses were 
located in the Inner Cities of our urban areas, most significantly 
in Clydeside (Holterraann 1975)- As well as the blight in these 
areas caused by redevelopment proposals, these severe conditions
were also related to wider structural issues. As a result a new 
approach was adopted which would attempt to develop a more 
"Comprehensive" approach to such problems.
The call for the "total approach" by Peter Walker,
Environmental Secretary in the 1970-7^ Conservative Government, 
emphasised the need for a multi-agency response to problems. The 
publishing of the Bains Report (1972) and Paterson Report (1973) on 
orgainsation and management structures for the new local authorities 
proposed the development of the corporate approach to the organisation 
of authorities. This was to influence how they would pierceive the 
problems of the inner cities. The 1969 and 197^ Housing Acts also 
represented a change in emphasis from redevelopment to rehabilitation 
of older housing stock primarily due to financial expediency.
Therefore the officially received view of the problems to be 
tackled by urban renewal in the inner cities changed from impatience 
with delays in reaching the end of the slums in the 1960's, to 
concern about the "urban crisis" in the 1970's, and indeed the crisis 
for the planning system in how to respond to these problems.
Many of the problems were related to a declining economic base. 
Industry was now locating outside the older urban areas and links 
were being made with the growth of new towns to the neglect of inner 
cities. The interrelated social and economic problems which ensued 
were directly tied to growing national problems not least of which 
was unemployment. By the mid 1970's the inner cities debate had 
become increasingly "politicised".
(d) Local Implications
The Holtermann Study (1975) highlighted the specific problems 
of Clydeside in which it was reported in the Glasgow Herald "It 
turns out that...the national picture is dominated by Scotland 
(whose cities, particularly Clydeside, apparently contain areas of 
severe deprivation on a scale not matched in England and Wales" 
(Glasgow Herald p 5 15/W5)*
Before reorganisation took place, a number of Policy Planning 
Reports (PPR's) were produced by Glasgow Corporation Planning 
Department in 1974. These attempted to provide city-wide policies 
for a number of topics eg. shopping, housing etc. It became evident 
from these that iraporant deficiencies were to be found in the inner 
cities of which Maryhill was one such area. In early 1975 the 
Corporation Planning Department produced "Social Deprivation in 
Glasgow" which although did not suggest priority areas for Maryhill 
it did indicate that a number of areas in Maryhill were giving cause 
for concern.
The newly formed Strathclyde Regional Council had also 
identified the main problems of unemployment and deprivation as 
implicit to their social policy. The designation of "Areas of 
Priority Treatment" by the Region in 1976 identified 3 of the 45 
areas which were located in the Corridor area published in the 
Council's "Multiple Deprivation" document. The growing importance 
being attached to inner city areas by central government was also 
becoming more overt under the 1974-1979 Labour Government.
In January 1976, Bruce Millan, Secretary of State for Scotland, 
announced a programme of £120m for urban renewal in the east end of 
Glasgow. The project was expected to last 9 years and would be co­
ordinated by the newly created Scottish Development Agency with 
the co-operation of Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District. This, 
was, the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) project. It was 
suggested at the time that central government co-ordination would 
allow the local authorities to concentrate on other areas. This 
therefore provided an opportunity for the two councils to show that 
local authorities could develop their own projects for their 
identified problem, areas. The fact that most of the inner city 
resources would be spent in Glasgow provided the opportunity to put 
this to the teO:t. It would allow the Regional Council to develop 
its deprivation policy to allow a co-ordinated approach to service 
and infrastruetural provision and for the District Council to allow 
the speedy implementation of its housing programmes.
In early 1977 the Regional Council through its Policy and 
Resources Committee, consulted with the District Council on their 
"Multiple Deprivation" Document and discussed the possibility of 
establishing joint initiatives within the city. Primarily as a 
result of this the District Council set out to develop their ideas 
on the establishment of a project in the Maryhill Corridor. By 
this time the Kelvin Local Plan was entering the latter stages 
of preparation and a start had been made to the Maryhill Local Plan 
covering the northern part of the Corridor. In April 1977 public 
mention was being made in the run-up to the District Council elections 
that a Special project was being developed for the Maryhill Corridor 
area.
(e) Conclusions
The particular circumstances identified had thus become 
conducive to Maryhill being chosen as an Initiative area. Nevertheless 
important negotiations still had to take place before that special 
project was fulfilled. These "political" discussions will be 
considered in the next chapter.
Before turning to the Maryhill Corridor Project itself, it is
necessary to highlight important issues which would have a bearing 
on the Project. Hiese issues would include; how the Project would
develop in terms of its political support; the ways in which the 
"corporate approach" could be used; the effect changed conditions, 
particularly financial ones, would have on the project. These and 
other dilemmas would have an important effect on interpreting the 
processes of implementation affecting the Maryhill Corridor Project.
CHAPTER 3
THE MARYHILL CORRIDOR PROJECT
This chapter attempts to examine;
(1) the factors and circumstances leading up to the 
Project; and
(2) to examine in greater detail the administrative 
structure relating to the initiative and the 
individuals, groups and agencies involved with 
and related to it.
This, it is hoped, can be achieved by examining different fields 
of concern which highlight examples of the implementation processes 
we are trying to investigate. Much of the activity which is 
examined concentrates specifically on the local authorities, and 
their relations with other agencies. This selectivity has been 
a necessary step due to the vast scale of the project whilst at 
the same time providing the focal point of analysis.
In September 1976, Peter Shore became the new Secretary of 
State for the Environment. As a response to the growing pressures 
of the inner city problem, a white Paper was published in 1977 which 
asserted: "the time has now come to give the inner areas an explicit
priority in social and economic policy, even at a time of particular 
stringency in public resources" (Secretary of Sthte for the 
Environment, June 1977)* policy was aimed at arresting the
decline of inner area population and employment opportunities by 
spatial discrimination in resource allocation to fund, comprehensive 
Renewal Programmes.
The change in direction, in priorities, was manifested earlier 
in the setting up of GEAR. The need for central government to be 
seen to be doing something was very important and was evidenced 
by the strong Scottish Office influence in setting up the 
"Governing Committee" of GEAR co-ordinated by the Scottish
Development Agency, an offshoot of the Scottish Economic Planning 
Department, A great deal of publicity surrounded the projects 
initiation as an attempt at the social and economic regeneration 
of the east end of Glasgow. The Inner City initiatives 
represented an important innovation in urban policy in an attempt 
to ameliorate conditions in these areas.
(a) Political Development
In the Labour Government (1974-79)* the then Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Dennis Healey, was pressured into having a second 
budget in 1977 in which an extra £50m was earmarked for inner areas. 
The local MP for Maryhill at this time, Jim Craigen, was and still 
is a very prominent person, particularly in the Scottish Labour 
Party. He approached Bruce Millan, Secretary State for Scotland 
and Hugh Brown, undersecretary of state at the Scottish Office, to 
lobby for resources and also generate more interest from central 
government in local areas. A considerable number of informal 
contacts were carried out to ensure that resources would be 
available for Maryhill.
After a meeting with Hugh Brown in 1977* Strathclyde Regional 
Council and Glasgow District Council agreed that they should accept 
a commitment to a co-ordinated effort to tackle the urban problems 
of two areas of the city, namely, the Maryhill Corridor and 
Priesthill on the south side.
Central Government was keen to be involved in these initiatives 
particularly because of the growing concern over public expenditure 
and its effect on inflation. In August 1978, a £56m "lease of life" 
for Maryhill was announced including the Augmented Urban Programme - 
a special programme of resources specifically for Glasgow and 
mainly at this time for Priesthill, GEAR and the Maryhill Corridor. 
The Regional Council had already put forward its 7 area initiatives 
including Maryhill and Priesthill which it had negotiated with the 
relevant District councils. Therefore, before the project could 
actually go ahead, political support had to be fostered and
commitment obtained through negotiation. In the midst of these 
negotiations no clear decisions on the organisational structure 
to be used had been made.
Uncertainty was also prevalent in the political arena.
Although, the political debate was focusing around the inner city 
problem, the peripheral estates were also experiencing severe 
problems mainly relating to social deprivation. In 1977 when the 
Labour Government was unpopular nationally, the district council 
elections resulted in a loss of 20 Labour seats largely in the 
peripheral estates. The district subsequently came under the control 
of a minority Conservative administration in which the Scottish 
National Party held the balance of power, because of their gains in 
the peripheral estates. No doubt this was a reaction to the lack 
of attention being paid to such areas. The pre-election 
announcement of The Corridor Project was perhaps hoped to secure the 
re-election of Labour councillors did not stop the election of a 
conservative and SNP councillor in the Corridor area. Nevertheless, 
a joint agreement between a Labour Region and District in response 
to Maryhill and other area initiatives would now be executed by 
a minority Conservative administration. As we shall see, this had 
important implications in the working of the administrative set-up.
The important fact to emerge was that the Project was a joint 
Region and District Initiative principally concerned with the 
intercorporate co-ordination of local authority programmes of 
capital investment and revenue expenditure. Compared with GEAR, 
the involvement of the Scottish Special Housing Association (SSHA) 
and the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) would not be as prominent.. 
The organisational context was also considerably narrower than in 
GEAR and the management structure was purposely to take a "low 
key1' character. Although this will be discussed in greater detail 
later, the important fact was that the Projectwas a response to 
circumstances, an’attempt to achieve the most out of opportunities 
which had been created.
When the Project was formulated, district Council policy for
Maryhill was already well established through the adoption of the 
Ifelvin Local Plan and the beginning of the Maryhill Local Plan both 
in 1978. At a broader level the Regional Council's Structure Plan 
and multiple deprivation policies, mentioned earlier, were being 
applied to the Maryhill situation and the other area initiatives.
This resulted in the production of the Development Plan for 
Maryhill in 1979 as the product of the inputs from various interests.
An important feature of the success of any project is the need 
to sustain its momentum, especially in the political arena. After 
the appointment of an initial joint co-ordinator to the Project which 
lasted only 2 weeks, the Region and district appointed separate 
co-ordinators. It was felt that the proposed joint arrangements 
would be unworkable. With the significant involvement of central 
government in GEAR it was accepted that such involvement could be 
an important sustaining factor in a project. The appointment of a 
civil servant, seconded from the Scottish Office as Glasgow District6' 
Co-ordinator for Maryhill was perhaps important in this sense. Of 
course, this was variously interpreted by others as to whether it 
represented central government controls on the District Council or 
whether it was a geniune attempt to co-ordinate with local 
government.
Certainly, the 1977 White Paper redefined the role of the 
Urban Renewal Unit (URU) in the Scottish Office proposing the need 
for greater co-ordination between central and local government.
Nevertheless, the Maryhill Corridor Project was neither to 
have the publicity which GEAR had received, nor its highly 
developed management structure.
At the time when the Corridor Project was initiated it 
represented a very early period in Inner City Policy. This would 
mean that the competition for resources between different areas 
would be negligible and with the existence of the Augmented Urban 
Programme, meant that things could go ahead relatively easily.
However, this basically applied to the limited financial commitment 
of the Region. The District funding for the Project was through 
its mainline budgets and as such would be much more susceptible 
to postponement since it involved large amounts of capital 
expenditure, mainly for housing.
The Labour Government was nearing its end shortly after the 
project was launched. It became pressuteii into pressing for greater 
expenditure cuts in local authority programmes. Even, although 
priority had been attached to Maryhill, central government cuts meant 
the shelving of whole strategies at Glasgow District, with only 
one major housing new build development taking place in the city in 
the late 1970's. The significant fact being that the development 
took place in Maryhill.
With the coming to power of the Conservative Government in 1979* 
a new set of circumstances came into existence. The suggestion that 
Inner City Policy would be kept under review was not enough to allay 
the concern of local authorities, particularly, with the announcement 
of a 3% cut in local authority expenditure in 1979/80. The new 
local government bill which was to be introduced later, with a 
tightening of control over local authorities was to markedly change 
the circumstances under which the original policy aims were launched. 
This resulted in considerable uncertainty over the policy and more 
specifically for Maryhill because it was a wholly local authority 
co-ordinated initiative which did not have the high level of 
political support its counterpart in the east end retained.
These changes were to continue over the years. The ideology 
at the time concerned the wasteful nature of local authorities and 
bureaucracy, their inefficiency and high spending, contributing to 
national economic problems. This paved the way for a stimulation 
of the private sector and the introduction of "quangoes" (quasi - 
non-governmental organisation) in the form of Urban Development 
Corporationswith much stronger links with central government and 
strict budgeting limits. This adverse political and economic climate,
particularly for local authorities would increase the uncertainty 
over their initiatives and their ability to be "responsible" 
authorities.
Changes were also occurring at the local level by the late 
1970's. At Strathclyde Region the strong Labour majority provided 
conditions of permanent one-party rule harnessing the potential for 
"strong government1 (Dearlove 1973)- Certainly, the political 
continuity was important in creating a stable environment to carry 
out the area initiatives as in Maryhill. The District Council was 
a different matter however. The minority Conservative administratipn 
relied on the support of the Scottish National Party councillors.
In face of changes in central government policy, the Conservatives 
attempted to introduce similar programmes of expenditure cuts at 
the local level. An emphasis was placed on increasing the private 
sector stock (not surprisingly since it is the council's main 
function) but more importantly this involved selling off 3% of 
council stock, particularly, in the most "desirable" areas of the 
city. The Conservative/SNP alliance was faltering however, with 
the minority administration defeated on issues of "houses for 
sale" and expenditure cuts. This was ultimately to lead to the 
resignation of the minority adminstration after a £30m package of 
expenditure cuts was defeated by the Labour and SNP councillors.
During the years before the resignation in September 1979» 
the Labour groups had produced several documents for its members 
which highlighted the need for new approaches to changed conditions. 
These were important in the development of the "alternative strategy" 
adopted when a Labour majority won the District elections in 1980 
including the introduction of an area management structure for the 
city.
The attempt to introduce the politics of the situation is a 
deliberate act to emphasise the variability of this arena and, as 
will be seen, the need for individuals, groups and agencies to act 
and respond within it. The 1977 District elections marked an 
important turning point mirrored in the transfer of resources
particularly for housing to the peripheral estates (Fig 3)*
Nevertheless, GEAR and Maryhill remained the top priorities 
for both councils, such that in the early 1980!s there was a swing 
back to these priorities in terms of the allocation of resources.
Even so, political pressure was growing by this time to end the 
Maryhill Corridor Project. This was also the case at Strathclyde 
Region where other initiatives had run their course and other areas 
had beer, identified as problem areas. As well as the growing problems 
in the peripheral estates, pressure was also coming from other inner 
city areas such as Govan on the south side whose councillors were 
lobbying for priority to their own area. Increased competition from 
other areas was therefore becoming increasingly .important and 
particularly affected Maryhill rather than GEAR, since the former 
lay wholly within the hands of the local authorities.
This raised questions about sustaining the momentum of the 
project by 1983i after the original 5 years duration for the Project.
Glasgow District Council's Social Deprivation in Glasgow 
Study (1983) highlighted other areas which were suffering greater 
hardships than Maryhill or Priesthill. This was also evidenced in 
the Regional Council’s Area Profiles (1982). To a large extent 
this provided the technical justification for the end of the 
Initiative, but which was underlain by more subtle political moves.
The above represents the political history of the Project in 
general terms, relating to local as well as national circumstances.
This has been carried out to show the importance of changing 
circumstances bearing on a particular area and the various influences 
exerted in different ways and affecting the direction of the Project.
What follows is an attempt to understand what happened in 
Maryhill and why, by concentrating on the actors and agencies 
involved at different levels and how they interacted to affect 
developments in the Corridor Project.
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(b) The Organisation Context
The new system of local government and the adoption cf the 
corporate approach were to have a significant effect on the 
management arrangements for the Project. Arrangements had also to 
be developed in line with ongoing commitments, particularly on the 
side of Glasgow District. (Fig *0
The management arrangements suggested for handling the Project 
involved setting up a "Maryhill Corridor Working Party" of officials 
with detailed knowledge of both capital projects and the quality and 
delivery of services in the Maryhill Corridor. In the south of the 
Corridor, a working party involving local elected members for both 
Region and District Councils and representatives from community groups 
had been meeting for about 3 years as part of the public participation 
exercise in the preparation of the Kelvin Local Plan, mentioned 
earlier. While this plan had been approved by the District Council 
in May 1978, it was decided to retain this working party, calling 
it the "Kelvin Local Plan Implementation Review Group" and use it 
as a means of obtaining public involvement in the Corridor Project 
overseeing the implementation of the local plan. In the north a 
similar working party had been formed for participation in the 
preparation of the Maryhill Local Plan. All of these groups would 
be chaired by a member of the Policy Co-ordination Unit of the 
Department of Administration and Legal Services in the District.
At the policy level, the idea was that auiy major issues 
concerned with the activities of single departments would be taken 
through normal committee channels. The Co-ordinating Committee at 
the District Council would receive regular progress reports and 
have am overseeing role in the Project, relating proposals for the 
Corridor to city-wide policies where any policy issues involving 
both Region and District departments would be resolved through a 
joint meeting between members of the District's Co-ordinating 
Committee and the Policy and Resources Committee at the Region.
At about this time Glasgow District Council was negotiating
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with the Urban Renewal Unit for the funding of a Policy Co­
ordination Unit which would carry responsibility for the co­
ordination of theNDistrict's activities in Maryhill and other areas. 
Within these discussions the suggestion was made by the Urban Renewal 
Unit that someone from central government might be appointed to the 
Unit. This led to a civil servant from the Scottish Economic 
Planning Department (SEPD) being seconded to the Policy Co-ordination 
Unit in the District for 2 years and within the Unit it was decided 
that this Secondee should act as co-ordinator for the Maryhill Project.
In setting up the arrangements for the Corridor Project at 
Strathclyde Region, it was decided that the approach should differ 
quite significantly from the other 6 area initiatives mentioned 
earlier. Given the size of the area, the co-ordinator's role 
(appointed separately by the Region) was seen as putting an emphasis 
on the "Mini Chief Executive" aspect and playing down the community 
development functions relative to the other initiatives. The 
individual chosen, Robert Parry, already had 16 years experience in 
administrative duties. Also the area management team, which would 
be the standard focus of official representation for the Region's side 
would be comprised of third tier (senior) officers. Political 
representation would be included through local members and a 
representative from the Policy and Resource Committee for all the 
initiatives, which in the Maryhill Project would, significantly, be 
a local Regional member, John Gray* Overall this represented a 
significant departure from the kind of structures discussed in the 
Region's papers on the Initiatives, although there was clearly scope 
for development within this basic framework.
In the District Council the primary aim of the Project was seen 
as "to get things done", (more projects, more money). The intention 
behind setting up the Policy Co-ordination Unit was to ensure a 
speedy and co-ordinated implementation of projects with the Maryhill 
Corridor Working Party ensuring proposals did not conflict and that 
departments wasted no time in implementation.
For the Region, the scale of the Project and size of the
population (c.40,000) would therefore result in the need for 
selectivity on the part of the co-ordinator and area management 
team to achieve purposeful intentionswith community groups particularly
when the formal structure and negotiations have to be conducted at
a much higher level, rather than ’’the grass roots approach” of 
other initiatives.
Consequently, the Region was faced with the problem of adapting 
their Initiative model to the larger scale of activity in Maryhill,
The approach selected was to involve people from senior levels in 
departments and create a forum in which they could discuss problems 
in the area plus policies and proposals on how to try to tackle them 
with local Regional Councillors and the Policy and Resources 
Representative. The community development function was^ to a large 
extent, left loosely defined. Subsequent developments resulted in 
the formation of sub-groupings, to allow departmental staff from 
both local authorities at all levels to discuss issues with each 
other linked directly to the management teams of the Region and 
District. Two such sub-groups were the Community Work Management 
Group and the Commerce and Industry Group. Their importance in 
relation to implementation processes will be discussed later.
As well as the formation of sub-groups, minor changes were to
be made to this Structure (Fig 5) through the introduction of area
management by the District in 1980. However, in order not to 
confuse the problem the Maryhill Corridor Working Party was retained 
as a sub-committee of the North West Area Management Team which 
included the Corridor area. The development of Divisional 
Deprivation Groups at the Region in 1981 and the Policy and Resources 
Sub-committee on deprivation was to be the new link through Policy 
Planning. The seconded co-ordinator for the District ended his post 
in August 1980 with his post continued through representation on the 
North West Area Management Team. In 1982 this led to the appointment 
of a Joint Co-ordinator, Richard Davies (a District employee) after 
the Regional co-ordinator, Robert Parry vacated his post after 
promotion in December 1981. On the whole, however, the formal 
structure remained intact.
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(c) The Co-ordinators
A special section is needed to define the role of the co-ordinator 
because of their key position between policy and implementation. 
Obviously, their roles would be clearly affected by their perceptions 
of the context within which they were working and other factors such 
as their own individual capacities, personal stances, and openness to 
learn.
In the case of the Maryhill District co-ordinator much of the 
thinking as to his role had been worked out prior to his appointment 
and was largely faced with taking on his role. Without having the 
links to those in higher levels in departments, as the other 
co-ordinators had, his ability to influence actions was fairly 
limited to the Officer groups set up through the Corridor Project. 
Nevertheless, this did not mean that his role was ineffective.
However, the co-ordinator*s role was basically seen as a 'lynch-pin' 
through the whole process of implementation and action. For the 
Regional co-ordinator and subsequent Joint co-ordinator the 
important links they had with higher level officials and politicians 
including local members was crucial to the development of this role 
and the way they would approach relations between departments, 
individuals and groups. The fact that they were employed full-time 
for the Maryhill Project was an important factor in developing 
commitment and support for the Project.
In time the role of the co-ordinator became characterised by 
progress chasing on projects, harrowing and persuading departments, 
individuals and groups, etc. The selectivity in this approach was 
necessary since "action’' would concentrate at a higher level of 
decision-making of formal and informal contacts with an important 
overview role of the many communities in the area. The use of 
informal contacts and flexibility to procedures was an essential 
prerequisite to achieving progress. These contacts and modifications 
did not necessarily take place within the formal management structure 
suggesting that in terms of getting things done a much broader 
"implementation structure" existed.
The co-ordinator's role was based on the assumption that 
co-ordination between departments in formulating and implementing 
proposals could be improved by middle-ranking and senior officials 
giving more attention to a particular area. This assumtption, 
in general, proved to be correct but not particularly thorough 
consensual agreement between departmental representatives, to 
co-ordinators, politicians etc. but rather through the ability of 
the Area Management Team and Corridor Working Party and those 
involved with them to direct resources and support for Maryhill 
through the close contact of senior officials and politicians. 
Progress was made in Maryhill which probably would not have emerged 
or been as far advanced without the presence of an area initiative;
"In pursuing progress it is clear that the 
ability of the co-ordinators to tackle 
re,lati.orrships with departmental officials 
at all levels and with elected members was 
crucial" (Institute for Operational Research 
Report) Ch 3 P* ^2
To summarise the key, pivotal position of the co-ordinators can 
be highlighted in that;
1) they were the main liaision between the two councils;
2) they were responsible for preparing the agenda for the 
meetings of the management team and working party;
3) any departmental activity concerned with the Corridor 
had to be brought to the attention of the co-ordinators;
*f) in the case of the Regional co-ordinator and
Subsequent Joinlj Co-ordinator, important links were 
developed with local councillors;
5) the lack of frequency of Local Plan Working Party; 
meetings meant that the community input would largely 
depend on the use of the direct informal channel to 
the co-ordinators;
6) being responsible directly to their respective Chief 
Executives meant that they had important links with
top-level personnel.
By the Co-ordinator using his contacts with those in central 
roles, either over and above the area team representative or using 
the teams view as a support he was to become seen externally as a 
leading central figure in pressing for changes in policies, 
practises or the priorty being given to the area.
(d) The Corporate Approach
The corporate approach developed since re-organisation 
emphasised the need to breakdown the departmental and professional 
stances and barriers to developing a common understanding of the 
Initiative aims. However, it was obvious that although the 
corporate approach would mean gaining consensus and agreement, it 
would also produce important conflicts which would have to be 
resolved in the progress towards getting things done in Maryhill.
It is important to understand that agreement was not necessarily 
based on common interests but rather on the relative weighting or 
power attributed to and by those involved with the Corridor Project. 
This included the full-time commitment of the co-ordinators and 
elected representatives and how departments would relate to the 
"ideology” of the Corridor Project. This is perhaps best evidenced 
by concentrating on the observed action to reveal significant 
features of the implementation.
One particular issue, in the face of changing circumstances 
sind uncertainty, was how priorities could be modified from the 
Development Plan (representing that which was to be implemented) 
within the political arena of formal and informed contacts which 
would determine what actually would take place in Maryhill.
One of the main political issues after the construction of 
Summerston in the northern part of the Corridor, was the lack of 
community facilities in the area. Lessons had been learned from 
the previous district elections in 1977 when many peripheral
estates seats v;ere lost from the Labour Party. The concern that 
Summerston may end up like the peripheral estates as well as the 
greater tenure mix in the area, allowed a considerable amount of 
priority to be given to the area. Many of the initial proposals 
for the area in the Development Plan, such as a library, and 
swimming pool had already been axed through cutbacks.
A situation then arose whereby the development of a community 
centre for the area was regarded as a top political priority.
However, the finance for the completion of phase 2 of the project 
lay under the control of the Education Department at the Region.
In its view other priorities had been identified the most important 
of which was the construction of the North Kelvinside Youth Wing 
in the south of the area in the ward of local Regional member 
John Gray. The Education Department's priorities were embodied 
withinthe development plan. However, these were to become modified 
in the political arena.
The education department put forward a report holding to 
their original intention to go ahead with the Youth Wing. The Policy 
and Resources Committee remitted the report back to the officers 
to meet with the Regional co-ordinator. The subsequent meeting of 
the Area Management Team with local member and representative of 
the Policy and Resources Sub-committee, John Gray, and 
Laurence McGarry (local member for Summerston and Maryhill) agreed 
to go-ahead with the Summerston community centre supported by the 
co-ordinator and conceded by John Gray with the concession that 
the Youth Wing would retain its position as the next priority. Thus, 
while the Education department still objected after presenting a 
minority report to the Policy and Resources Committee, the latter 
overruled their decision in favour of the area management team.
This highlights the significance of political representation 
and the powerful role of the co-ordinator as well as the importance 
of negotiation and compromise which are central to implementation 
processes. Thus the corporate approach is underlain by much more
subtle processes of political bargaining, in this case to the 
interests of the area management team located at the important 
interface between politics and administration.
Thus, even with the low key management structure, this did 
not mean that it had no power. The very fact of bringing senior 
officials of different departments together had an important effect 
on allowing informal contacts to be developed which at least would 
allow them to identify with the multi-faceted problems of the area 
and at best allow modification and new projects and proposals 
through such contacts in terms of financial and political uncertainty.
However, effectiveness in terms of the co-ordination between 
departments and individuals is never always the case. This was 
particularly so in one of the sub-groups which was developed, the 
community Works Management Group. This was an attempt to bring 
officials from the Region and District together to discuss matters 
of relevance to community development. This was attended by the 
co-ordinators, elected members and representatives from Housing,
Social Work, Community Education and the community workers who were 
located in the area. In part the problems of this subgroup were 
due to communication problem in the sense that community workers 
were not in daily contact with the management team. This was 
compounded by the lack of a Community Development Organiser (CDO) 
for 2 years between August 1980 and September 1982.
However, the main problems occurred through clashes of interests 
and roles. The community workers tended to fall into the trap of 
airing views of the community for themselves, and such views were 
not given a sympathetic ear. The lack of classification as to what 
the group was to achieve was compounded by the different values of 
the different departmental representations and elected members 
involved as to exactly what issues were most important. For example 
the high level of analysis of the reports of the community workers 
from Social Work and the greater flexibility they had in which to 
respond to issues contrasted with the much more limited, and more 
strictly controlled community education input. Thus, while most
of the social projects had been decided by 1978, they did not really 
get off the ground till 1981 due to departmental problems rather 
than financial ones. In 1982 the group was disbanded due to these 
problems.
This contrasts significantly with the Commerce and Industry 
Sub-groups consistingcf the co-ordinators and senior officials of 
the planning and estates departments of both councils in general.
This group allowed sites to be identified and assessed for industrial 
and commercial use at a period when there was important lobbying to 
allocate land for industrial use from the stagnating housing 
programme. The increasing emphasis by central government and on 
encouraging small businesses by providing advice and information to 
local entreprenurs, a role for which the Commerce and Industry group 
was ideally suited. The group took a new lease of life when the 
origins! District Co-ordinator, Alisdair McLeod, and the Town Clerk 
Depute, Theo Crombie were instrumental in fostering commitment to 
industrial and business aspects which was continued under the Joint 
Co-ordinator, Richard Davies. The small number in the group meant 
that informal contacts were crucial and allowed it to be much more 
flexible to the needs in the area. It was also aided by other resources 
and professional inputs from other bodies such as the Scottish 
Development Agency.
(e) A Multi-Agency Approach
The input of other agencies is an important aspect of the 
Corridor Project. Although Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District 
were the main protagonists of the Project, the role of other bodies 
including in particular, the Scottish Development Agency (SDA), the 
Scottish Special Housing Association (SSHA) and local housing 
associations with their own independant programmes provided a 
necessary addition to the organisational and resource requirements 
for the project;.
In terms of environmental improvements and the construction of 
the Science Park, which although delayed the adoption of the
Maryhill Local Flan in 1981, the Scottish Development Agency 
provided necessary collaboration with the two authorities.
However, in terms of the main development relating to the Corridor 
the housing associations although carrying out their own projects 
were also able to take over developments originally intended by 
Glasgow District Council who, due to financial cutbacks, were 
unable to fulfill their commitments.
The Housing Rents and Subsidies (Scotland) Act 1975 and the 
Holterman Study (1975) provided much of the support for local 
housing associations which aided the development of Queens Cross 
and Maryhill housing associations in Maryhill.
Housing Associations and Co-operatives were also strongly supported 
in the Scottish Office by Hugh Brown, undersecretary of state, 
mentioned earlier in connection with the initiation of the Project.
The fact that local District Councillors were also represented 
on the management committees of the housing associations, aided the 
ability to transfer projects and developments to the housing 
associations. The role of the Scottish Special Housing Association 
was also flexible in this manner through the Redevelopment Assistance 
Programme between the District and the SSHA which is discussed later.
(f) Local Political Factors
The political developments surrounding the Project have been 
considered at the beginning of this chapter. .It is important to 
look at how those circumstances affected situations at the local 
level and what part they played in the implementation of Projects.
Towards the aim of initafcing the Project, it is quite clear 
that the situation was condLusive to this. There was a broad 
agreement at national and local level on the need to respond to 
inner city problems. A broad, vague agreement was important in 
allowing the various parties involved eg. Strathclyde Region,
Glasgow District, the Scottish Office, local MPs and councillors
senior officals etc. to move towards the projects initiation even 
although the exact procedures on its implementation were perceived 
differently by those involved. More of this will be discussed in 
the analysis in Chapter 5-
To a large extent, the Initiative was a response to circumstances 
with the local authorities, particularly Glasgow District desiring 
to show that they could develop their own initiatives and responses 
to local problems. Although the Maryhill Corridor Project did not 
have the sophisticated structure and nolitical backing on the GEAR 
project, ti.ere were important factors which were to allow the 
Corridor Project to have an important focus in the political arena 
(see Table of Events).
There seems little doubt however that the hung District 
Council from 1977-1979t posed problems for the co-operation between 
Region and District. This was evidenced in the lack of District 
political representation on the Region*s Area Management Team.
The presence of Conservative councillors, it was felt would make 
things difficult and thus the two management structures remained 
fairly separate.
Not until the Labour Administration was elected in 1980, were 
relations more .amenable , although by this time changes had taken 
place in other areas. Nevertheless, much of the work of both 
councils was carried out separately anyway, although the hung council 
did represent a significant "political'* problem.
An important feature in the Maryhill situation was the 
prominence of Maryhill politicans on both councils. The leader of 
the Labour Group at the District, Jean McFadden had her ward 
originally in the Maryhill Corridor. Six months before the 1980 
District elections, Robert Gray (now Provost Gray) took up the 
position of City Treasurer. Danny Crawford, elected in 1980, was 
given the title U^ f Baillie Crawford occupying a prominent position 
on the council. All had their wards in Maryhill and the latter two 
being represented on the local housing association. The effect of
such prominence is perhaps best seen in the housing arena.
Although the Housing Committee included a large range of 
councillors from the city, there was a sub-committee of this entitled 
the Housing Core Group formed under the minority administration 
consisting of a smaller number of councillors but on which sill the 
councillors from the Maryhill Corridor area had a place. One cannot 
infer too much from this, but it is obvious that this allowed a much 
easier passage of proposals favouring the priority of Maryhill. It 
also allowed close contacts between local councillors for Maryhill 
to be more flexible to changing circumstances. For example, it 
allowed priorities to be changed to accommodate projects.
The Oran Street housing development (Fig 6 ) was proposed much 
earlier than its eventual starting date in 1982. However, for this 
to be achieved an important deal was made between local councillors 
Buchanan in the Summerston Ward and Baillie Crawford in the Kelvin 
Ward. This allowed a change of priority to be made from the original 
plan intentions of a sheltered housing development in Shiskine Drive 
in Buchanans ward to making the Oran Street development top priority 
located in the Kelvin Ward. This was justified by the greater 
dereliction in the southern part of the Corridor, such that the whole 
site could be completed within the 1982-*+ capital programme when 
finance was available.
This important negotiation and bargaining had arisen from the 
financial uncertainty over housing projects. An important agreement 
was reached between the SSHA, Glasgow District Council and the 
Scottish Office in Spring 1979 resulting in the Redevelopment 
Assistance Programme whereby areas designated for rehabilitation 
or new build by the District would be transferred to the SSHA. 
However, in relation to the Oran Street development, the SSHA, was 
experiencing cuts in funding itself and concerned that too much 
priority was being given to Maryhill. Subsequently, a conflict 
arose between 2 sites which the SSHA had earmarked, the Oran Street 
site and another site in Priesthill. Pressure on the priority 
attached to Maryhill resulted in the Priesthill site being choosen
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resulting in the negotiations between councillors to allow Glasgow 
District subsequently to fund the Oran Street development. Thus 
the Oran Street development changed hands 3 times from Glasgow 
District to the SSHA and back to Glasgow District.
ihis example serves to highlight an important feature of the 
Initiative and how projects, through negotiation and compromise by 
specific individuals, were allowed to go ahead albeit not as 
originally intended in the Development Plan. This was also an 
important factor in the Housing Case Study examined in the next 
chapter.
The role of Regional Councillors was equally significant in 
Laurence McGarry (Maryhill and Summerston) Chairman of the Economic 
Development Committee at the Region and more importantly for the 
Maryhill Corridor,John Gray who became the Policy and Resources 
Representative for the Maryhill Initiative. As well as this the 
individual commitment to the area, particularly of John Gray, 
represented another strong factor in the role played in developing 
opportunities in the area which will be further examined in the 
next chapter.
The significance of informal contacts in these situations 
must not be underestimated, particularity when changed circumstances 
demanded versatile methods of responding to opportunities which 
were highly important in how ’’action” would be achieved.
(g) Financial Considerations
Financial Considerations play an important part in the 
implementation of projects. For the District Council most of the
funding for the Project was through mainline budgets, especially 
for housing. These budgets were to be significantly affected by 
changes in centred government policy which led to the abandonment 
and postponement of some projects. Thus, obtaining resources for 
projects greatly needed the priority attached to the area and the 
support of members and officials edike. The concern that nothing
V9
would get done acted as a spur to look for other sources of 
finance which had a spin-off effect in Maryhill. This largely led 
to the Redevelopment Assistance Programme discussed earlier#
The Region’s input was largely funded through urban aid, which 
although being "\% of the total Regional budget, was an important 
source of finance for the Project# The growing Competition between 
different groups resulted in a great demand being placed on urban 
aid resulting in administrative changes to the Region’s overseeing 
role on urban aid applications. Even within the Corridor Project 
this was also the case discussed in the case studies which was largely 
left to the area management team. Changes also occurred through 
central government with the Circular from the Scottish Development 
Department (SDD) in 1981 stating that a greater emphasis should be 
given to voluntary groups and community businesses. In practice 
this aided the development of Maryhill Community Business Limited, 
supported through the Commerce and Industry Groups. At the same 
time there was also stricter limits placed on urban aid applications, 
partly due to the increasing number of them.
In large part the key to making the most of opportunities was 
flexibility. This was highlighted in the use ma;de of the Maryhill 
Corridor fund. This fund of £200,000 per annum from the District 
was intended to be used for "odds and ends11 like signposting and 
maintenance etc# It was not realised till 1982 when Richard Davies 
became Joint Co-ordinator that the money was not being used to any 
large extent# In the event, many departments and agencies including 
housing associations used the finance to carry out repairs and 
maintenance on selected housing improvements and on grassing gap 
sites until construction could begin etc. This shows the importance 
of flexibility and modification in developing opportunities for action.
(h) Conclusion
Within the structures that had been created (formal and informal) 
people were making progress in expediting many of the larger projects 
proposals; mounting smaller scale initiatives to tackle specific
problems; identifying needs in the area and pressing departments 
and agencies to pay more attention to the area. The Corridor Project 
developed as a relatively heterogeneous collection of activities 
encapsulating within itself almost all local authority activity in 
Maryhill•
The Maryhill C o r r i d o r  Project from the beginning was established 
from within each authority as opposed to being based on sin apparently 
independent basis as in GEAR.
In this sense the two authorities have been able to take a 
more realistic approach to the project accepting the limitations of 
the underlying economic trends and of the organisational bureaucracy 
which they are part of. This has also made it easier to respond to 
changes and add flexibility to the situation. This contrasts with 
GEAR which tended to take on identity of its own creating difficulties 
over the "ownership" of the initiative.
The Tavistock Institute for Operational Research Report carried 
out on the 7 area Initiatives of the Regional Council commented on 
the Corridor Project suggesting that;
"it is difficult to talk about the implementation 
of the Initiative; rather the Initiative has 
developed through a process of influence and 
counter-influence and adaptation " (IOR 1981,
Ch 6 p *t)
and continued by saying that;
"So much depends on negotiations and 
other transactions between organisations 
and individuals that one has to continually 
bear in mind the ’total system* of 
relationships involved in trying to promote 
a more co-ordinated and responsive 
local government stance towards the
problems of the area" (Op Cit 1981, Ch 6 p 4)
It will be evident that a combination of factors has guided 
the subsequent events in Maryhill. This is further complicated 
by the multiplicity of linkages between the many, individuals, groups 
and agencies involved in "action” in the Initiative. The key role 
of politicans and co-ordinators has been introduced as has their 
response to changing circumstances. In the next chapter these 
problems which have been identified will be examined in greater 
detail attempting to show; how "action" is defined in the context 
of circumstance; the role of those involved and their perceptions/ 
attitudes etc; the dynamic nature of processes affecting the area; 
and the crucial role of political representation in and for the 
area. It therefore becomes important not to see implementation 
as the simple transfer of policy into action but seeing it in the 
perspective of how "action" is going to be achieved.
CHAPTER if
THE CASE STUDIES
In this chapter, four case studies have been selected dealing 
with specific proposals and developments in the Maryhill Corridor. 
An attempt is made through the narratives to relate the detailed 
discussion of the cases to the general considerations on the 
Maryhill Corridor Project which have already been introduced.
The case studies attempt to examine the roles and actions of 
the various actors and agencies involved and the bearing these 
had on developments in the case studies.
The four cases which have been selected are as follows:
(a) Case Study 1 (Community) - The Maryhill Community
Central Halls;
(b) Case Study 2 (Community) - Maryhill Burgh Halls;
(c) Case Study 3 (Commercial) - Taggarts Motor Company
(Phase 1); and
(d) Case Study k (Housing) - Kirkland St/Raeberry St
Development (Fig 7)
Each case study is preceded by a "Chronology of Events", 
giving a brief guide to the main events in the history and 
development of the cases which are discussed in greater detail 
in the subsequent narratives.
These case studies will provide the subject material for 
the analysis of the factors which have been seen to be significant 
in the analysis of implementation processes and which are discussed 
in Chapter 5*
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CASE STUDY 1 (COMMUNITY) - CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
MARYHILL COMMUNITY CENTRAL HALLS
DATE
1975
1976 
1976
April 1976
March 1977 
June 1979
April 1981
EVENT
Action Committee formed
Urban Aid Application proposed to buy church
Management Committee set-up
Urban aid application for main programme 
submitted
Urban aid applications approved
Further funding obtained through the 
Maryhill Corridor Fund.
Resources obtained from Maryhill Corridor 
Fund.
(a) CASE STUDY 1 (COMMUNITY) - The Maryhill Community Central
Halls
The Community Central Halls example provides an interesting 
case of how various agencies, individuals and groups responded to and 
directed a changing situation. In particular the role of the 
individual is highlighted in the bargaining process.
The Community Central Halls (Fig 7) are located within the 
Kelvin Local Plan area on the Maryhill Road.
Originally the Halls were a Methodist Church but due to a 
falling congregation and lack of finance, it seemed likely that the 
building would close. However, before this doubt emerged over the 
future of the church in the mid-1970's, its halls were being used 
by numerous community groups providing for young children to elderly 
people, and who had become attached to the building and recognised 
it as a focal point in the area, providing the necessary facilities 
(Plate 3)*
Thus while the future of the building was in doubt, an
Ia m  J oint
Plate 3 -  M a r y h i l l  Communi t y  C e n t r a l  Ha l l ;  An e x a m p l e  of 
l oca l  c o m m u n i t y  d e v e l o p m e n t .
opportunity also presented itself to use the building for community 
development. If subsequent action was not taken by certain 
individuals and groups the Church would have closed. In this sense 
the role of local councillors, John Gray (Region) and John Ross 
(Glasgow District) became very important. Both councillors held 
their ’'surgeries’' in the Halls at this time and realising the 
potential value of the Halls were in a position to act on it.
Regional Councillor John Gray became a key individual. In 
recognising the needs the building would serve, an Action Committee 
was formed in 1975 and chaired by Mr Gray. Included on this committee 
were professional people from the area including Colin Williams a 
local resident who subsequently became chairman of the Management 
Committee and who was Director of the Glasgow District Council for 
Voluntary Service.
Initially, however, Mr Gray approached the Regional Council in 
an attempt to get them to purchase the building as the elders of 
the Methodist Church had decided they were going to sell the building. 
At the same time the Kelvin Local Plan was going through its stages 
and the local Plan Working Party meetings were being held in the 
Halls. Petitions were organised to increase pressure on the Region 
to buy the property. However, significant steps had to be taken in 
order to make progress. This included the need to agree the use of 
the site within the Kelvin Local Plan to incorporate the Halls new 
function as a ’’community centre”. The consent, however, for using 
a former church property for community use also had to be negotiated 
in order to allow the church to be purchased from the owners.
Time, therefore, became the most important factor. Mr Gray 
was able to exert, through informal contacts with the local district 
councillor and the Director of Planning at the District Council,
James Rae, considerable influence to allow "flexibility” to be given 
to the subsequent use of the building. Through pushing the proposal 
through contacts in the Region’s Chief Executive department a grant 
was eventually obtained from the Scottish Office for £65,000. The 
money obtained was ailso pairtly a product of circumstances in that 
this was very much the start of the rationalisation of procedures for
urban aid applications in 1976 and therefore they were few and far 
between. It is doubtful whether such an amount would be obtainable 
today.
With the knowledge that finance had been secured, agreement 
still had to be reached for the owners of the church to sell to the 
Region. Negotiations then took place in which John Gray played a 
vital part. When the owners agreed to sell to the Regional Council, 
they held out for 2 conditions: (1) that no alcohol would be
consumed in the hall; and (2) that no gambling would take place.
Although there was a Halls Committee at that time, no constitution 
or management group had been formed to give any guarantee on these 
conditions. The Urban Aid grant could not be available indefinitely 
such that a decision had to be made. With the Church owners holding 
out on the above conditions a compromise had to be found. This 
involved John Gray giving a personal guarantee that no drinking, 
gambling etc. would take place for one year and that no licence would 
be granted. This was balanced by a deadline being placed on the 
purchase of the property of 2k hours from when the compromise was 
made. Obvibusly the church owners would lose out on a substantial 
amount of money and accepted the guarantee, and sold the building 
to the Region.
Much of the above activity took place before the Maryhill Project 
was initiated. Nevertheless, this serves to highlight the processes 
and characteristics of implementation which this dissertation is 
attempting to define as well as introducing the necessary pretext to, 
this case study during the life time of the Project.
The Maryhill Commuhity Central Halls is a unique example of 
a wholly community development run by local people and for local 
people. It was suggested that it could take on the role of 
community development in the area through Regional Council aid in 
line with their policy objectives.
When the church came into the Regions ownership, a proper
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management committee was set up in 1976. This committee included 
local people, some of whom were lawyers, architects who were able 
to articulate views and who had experience in management. The role 
of Colin Williams as chairman was also very important through bis 
experience in the voluntary sector. In time, this helped the 
committee to run their own management arrangements and urban aid 
applications. However, there was also a considerable turnover of 
people involved in the project as people moved away through 
redevelopments and thus could not remain on the committee. Thus 
there was a problem of continuity.
Nevertheless, the whole project was strongly backed by the 
Region and particular involvement from the Rev. Geoff Shaw, the 
first convenor of Strathclyde Region who expressed considerable 
support for the Community Halls development. Indeed, so much was 
this concern that a proposal has been put forward to erect a bust of 
the late convenor in the Community Central Halls.
The support from within the Regional Council was bolstered by 
the publishing of the Worthington Report which stressed the 
importance of catering for local needs but not in the paternalistic 
fashion as in the past. Thus conditions were conducive for the 
community to carry out what would be the Region*s task of community 
development.
The applications for finance were to be made through the 
Regional Council. The main urban aid application was in April of 
1976 when the Management Committee was formed and obtained on the 
1st of March 1977 for an initial period of 3 years and subsequently 
ffcnding was obtained for a further 2 periods of 2 years, O 98O-82 
and 1982-8*0 and for one final year up to March 1985« Urban aid 
was granted in November 1979 for 7 years (3years + 2 years + 2 years) 
till the 30th of April 1986 as part of the contingency funding for 
the Project ie. continuing the Halls project when it came off the 
main urban aid funding in March 1985. Through these resources 
the Halls have become a vehicle for local employment eg. renovation 
projects managing and running the Halls cafe etc.
Much of the progress occurred through community representatives 
"wising-up" to questions of looking for sources of organisational 
and resource requirements. At present the totail number of staff 
employed numbers fifty six.
Much of the finance for the project therefore had already been 
approved before the Corridor Project began. However, the political 
priority attached to Maryhill at this time had an important effect 
on the amount of funding obtained for the Halls. At that time there 
was very little competition between different community groups for 
funding and most of these were run by the local authorities. Thus 
the unique character of the Community Halls development and its 
isolated nature assured that finance would be available. This 
contrasts with the Burgh Halls saga in the next section where the 
later application for urban aid ran into difficulties.
This also became the case later on in the Community Central 
Halls although by that time ie. 1979* it was well established. In 
fact so successful in attracting resources was the Management 
Committee that some "differences1’ occurred between the latter and 
the Region. The Department of Architectural and Related Services 
(DARS) was concerned that the size of the premises and the scale 
of proposals by the committee would lead to problems in 
accommodating the various functions it performed.
There were other important trends and factors which were also 
to have a bearing on further implementation of proposals for the 
Community Central Halls. In 1979* there was a change in Central 
government when the Conservative Party came to power. Public 
expenditure cuts were pursued with greater vigour and uncertainty 
surrounded the future of urban policy. The stricter controls being 
placed on urban aid applications, was in part due to controls on 
finance and partly due to the increase in applications for resources. 
In relation to the case study this meant that it was much harder to 
obtain resources. This is illustrated by the attempt to obtain funds 
for renovations which were to be carried out on the building in 1981.
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The "expertise" that existed within the Central Halls enabled 
the committee to process its own applications for funding. However, 
the concern that was being expressed over the over-attraction of 
funds to the project at the Region resulted in the latter applying 
for urban aid for their own architects in May 1981. The processing 
of the application and the drawing up of plans, however, were subject 
to delays. In fact, the Region’s architects did not draw up the 
plans for the renovations until ^hristmaus 1981. This meant it was 
early 1982 before they were able to commence by which time the urban 
aid funding had been lost since it was now the end of the financial 
year. In part this resulted in the "differences" between the Region 
and the Halls mentioned earlier. Other councillors could not under­
stand why applications had been continuously approved for the Central 
Halls, not realising that none of the money had ever been spent. A 
similar situation occurred in 1983 but was able to be pushed through 
before the urban aid "freeze" in January 1984. However, by this time 
the date for acceptance of the tender for the renovations had expired 
ie 3 months after the contract was confirmed. In the event, the 
building contractors Dickies * had to be asked to hold their price for 
6 months at the same fixed price, the significant fact being that if 
the price had been changed in accordance with inflation, this would 
necessitate having to resubmit the application through the Scottish 
Office, In the event the request was accepted and the work subsequently 
carried out.
The Community Central Halls also obtained funding through 
central Government from the Manpower Services Commission (MSC).
The provision of various job opportunities was initially controlled 
by the Manpower Services Commission until the adjustment of MSC 
schemes through an agency basis in 1982. 'Hiis new approach created 
a new tier within this process. This new tier of "management agents" 
eg. the Glasgow Council for Voluntary Services (who suggested the 
Development Officer for the Community Central Halls) had to carry 
out the task of matching new schemes with those coming off-stream 
with MSC leaving themselves with the relatively less time-consuming 
task of monitoring.
Within the present economic climate schemes have therefore
became limited and timetabling has become much more.important. Such 
a trend could be compared to the increase in budgeting and technical 
controlsAimits on management processes.
This example illustrates the increasing difficulties the project 
faced later on in life as well as the importance of circumstances and 
external factors bearing on decisions and actions.
There are important comparisons and contrasts to be drawn 
between the Community Central Halls and the Burgh Halls case study 
in the next section.
CASE STUDY 2 (COMMUNITY) - CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
MARYHILL BURGH HALLS
DATE
April 1977
June 1977 
September 1977
October 1977 
November 1978 
February 1979
June 1979 
July 1979 
August 1979
September 1979
March 1980 
June 1980 
January 1983
February 198^
EVENT
Meeting of Policy and Resources Subcommittee 
on Deprivation
Application made for Urban Aid funding
Application approved by Scottish Office for 
inclusion in Augmented Urban Programme
Police due to move out of building
Additional £35^000 on original estimate
Department of Architectural and Related 
Services (DARS) estimate cost at £200,000 
due to deterioration and vandalism.
Project recosted to £^-01,300
Policy and Resources Subcommittee visit
Letter from Burgh Hall Committee rejecting 
offer
Policy and Resources Committee reject 
continued funding of project. Memo to Director 
of DARS to consider demolition of police building
Burgh Halls obtains B-listed status
Gairbraid Community Education Centre proposed
Urban Aid application submitted by Trust for 
£100,00 - not approved. Proposed feasibility 
study.
Feasibility study completed*
P l a t e  4 -  Mar yhi l l  Burgh Hal l ;  A h i s t o r i c a l  l a n d m a r k .
(b) CASE STUDY 2 (COMMUNITY) - Maryhill Burgh Halls
The Burgh Halls (Fig 7) have a long history in Maryhill as it 
does in the Corridor Project itself. Hie Burgh Hall was opened in 
1878, the important fact being that the centenary of the building and 
the adjacent police station in 1978 coincided with the start of the 
Corridor Initiative and the initiation of the Maryhill Local Flan 
(Plated) •
The starting point for this case study is taken in 1977» when 
concern over the deteriorating condition of the building was voiced 
firstly by the local MP Jim Craigen and taken up by the local 
Regional Councillor, Lawrence McGarry. Such concern was hopefully 
to herald a bright future for the building when it was included 
within the ^Higmented Urban Programme in ^pril 1977 after a meeting 
of the Policy and Resources Subcommittee on deprivation. After which 
the Region architects were asked to prepare a scheme for modernisation 
and an estimation of costs, and a draft application to be prepared 
by Lawrence McGarry.
Such a decision was to be in line with Strathclyde Regional 
Councils policy on deprivation outlined in its "Areas of Need" 
document and in the Region's aims and guidelines for Urban Aid 
projects ie. (1) to alleviate in some way the problems of poverty 
in the area; (2) to foster some kind of community feeling; (3) to 
assist underpriveledged groups in the community; and (^+) to support 
community initiatives, of which the Burgh Halls was one.
The Burgh Hall Committee formed initially had Lawrence McGarry 
as its interim chairman. Hie intention behind the project was to 
retain the building as part of the historical heritage of Maryhill 
and to allow it to revert back to its original role sis a focal point 
for community activities.
The April meeting allowed the go-ahead to be made on an Urban 
Aid application which was for repairs to the Burgh Hall and police 
station including fire and safety repairs, electical, heating,
external and roof repairs etc. Also included within this grant was 
the position of Development Officer and two caretakers, on similar 
lines to the Community Central Halls,
The application was submitted in June 1977 and approved in 
September the sum of £102,2*10 capital costs and recurring revenue 
costs of £13,500 for 3 years, by the Urban Aid Renewal Unit at the 
Scottish Office covering 75% of the costs.
The police who were housed in the adjacent building were to 
vacate the premises in October 1977 to allow work to be carried out 
as soon as possible. When approval was given a Management Committee 
of local representatives groups was set up.
It is important to realise that other events were occurring in 
the area at this time which were to have an important bearing on the 
outcome of the Burgh Halls.
The nearby Gairbraid Primary School, like many schools in the 
area, was facing declining school rolls and plans were proposed for 
the closure of the school. Around the same time Glasgow District 
Council had proposed a "one-roof leisure centre" for the area which, 
they perceived, would include the necessary demolition of the Burgh 
Hall and the Primary School.
It was expected that after the Police vacated their part of 
the building, the architects from the Department of Architectural 
and Related Services (DARS) would draw up plans for the building's 
renovation. However, the Burgh Hall was to be plagued by many 
difficulties involving conflicts of interest, ambiguity of roles 
and changed circumstances.
Although the Burgh Halls "Campaign" was begun before the 
Corridor Project actually began, the lobbying by the local MP 
Jim Craigen and councillors was done in anticipation of such a 
project emerging such that the priority to be attached to the area 
would allow greater attention to be paid to projects like the Burgh
Halls in Maryhill.
Such a priority was to be compounded by the lack of community 
facilities in the northern end of Maryhill, particularly with the 
construction of the housing estate in Summerston. The Survey 
Report for the Maryhill Local Plan stated that the threshold 
population for a community centre would be 17,500 while the population 
of the local plan area was 26,000. As well as this the Survey 
Report (1978) had earmarked the area where the Halls were located as 
a geographical focal point for Community facilities to serve the 
area. However, as we shall see, the situation was inherently much 
more complex than the straightforward circumstances described above.
In January 1978, the Management Committee gained possession of 
the Building but since that period the project has been fraught with 
difficulties.
In mid 1978, there was an industrial dispute in the National 
Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO) which affected the 
Department of Architectural and Related Services (DARS) and which was 
mainly concerned with staff shortages. This was the first in a series 
of difficulties. With the industrial dispute no progress was made 
on the drawing up of plans and the architects were "blacking" the use 
of consultants for their projects. However, there were also the 
"normal11 difficulties to be overseen such as the tendering of work 
to plumbers, joiners, electricians, builders etc. Uncertainty 
arose as to how the money was to be used, whether the private 
contractors could be allowed to go ahead and how exactly was the 
Urban Aid Grant to be managed.
The considerable doubt over the way the project was progessing 
through the Augmented Urban Programme led in November 1978 to a 
meeting with DARS, the Regional Co-ordinator (Robert Parry), the 
Director of Policy Planning, Community Education and local 
councillors etc. The failure to carry out construction work and 
the problems of administration and departmentalism had resulted in 
an estimated expenditure of only £15,000 of the original £102,2*+0.
With the finance being controlled through Community Education at 
the Region, responsibility was to lie with them. It later transpired 
from the Regional Co-ordinat6.rs notes, that the Community Education 
section did not see it as their responsibility even although in fact 
they were the client department. There were also problems relating 
to the lack of expertise on the management committee, by this time 
run by local representatives, who did not have the procedures, and 
continuity which was so successful in the Community Central Halls, 
and who failed to keep pressure on the various departments at the 
Region. Again this was not just a problem of communication for the 
Community Education section were never happy about the use of the 
Burgh Halls as a community centre. Indeed, the main momentum for 
the project lay in the hands of the Management Committee and the 
local councillors and politicians mainly due to the historical 
significance of the building.
Apparently superfical, communication problems were underlain 
by questions of departmental responsibility, the lack of clarity 
over the priority of the project, and a distinct failure in the 
processes of negotiation and bargaining.
Time was smother important factor in the project. Delays in 
repairing the building resulted in the need for more resources being 
asked for - Blame was placed on vandalism, weather deterioration and 
the "irresponsibility1’ of the caretakers employed by the Committee. 
Some haggling emerged between the Committee and the Region as to 
what were the real reasons which resulted in the committee stsking 
the Region to re-affirm its support to the project.
The overriding motivation for the retention of the Burgh Hall 
was the historical link with the area and the vociferous defence of 
that by the Management Committee. However, circumstances were to 
change which were predominantly related to finance and to the 
increasing number of community groups in the area needing new 
facilities, such that the Burgh Halls Management Committee no longer 
became the dominant voice in the area. It was also realised that a 
further £35,000 was necessary Over and above the original estimates.
The new cost details had to be submitted to the Policy and 
Resources Subcommittee on deprivation in January 1979 and subsequently 
to the Urban Renewal Unit at the Scottish Office in Edinburgh, The 
continued industrial dispute was to mean that much letter writing had 
to take place with the Urban Renewal Unit eventually asking for a 
breakdown of costs. The upper limit on applications of £200,000 was 
eventually applied for but again the contract date was to run out 
after the three month tendering for the contract.
Running through this chain of events was the District Council's 
original intention to construct a one-roof leisure centre. It was 
eventually proposed to cost £5 million with the foundations alon.e 
costing in the region of three quarters of a million pounds. With 
the cutbacks in public expenditure, the project was no longer seen 
as viable.
The role of the Policy and Resources Committee was extremely 
important throughout the project and was to take on a greater role 
as things were coming to a head in mid 1979« In June 1979, a total 
re-costing of the project was asked for by the leader of the 
Regional C0Uncil, Dick Stewart. The Department of Architectural 
and Related Services eventually came up with an estimated cost of 
£*t0*t,300 on 26 June 1979« This estimate was subsequently followed 
by a visit to the Burgh Halls by the Policy and Resources subcommittee 
including the leader of the Council. All major decisions affecting 
the area were ultimately made at the centre. The powerful sub­
committee in this case, however, was to directly intervene and 
strike a deal over the matter.
The estimate was obviously much larger than the original 
£102,2**0 such that the project would not be viable. At the same 
time the closure of Gairbraid Primary School was announced and 
it was put forward that the conversion of these premises to 
community use would be in the range of £200,000, the upper limit 
for urban aid applications. Thus a compromise was proposed that 
the Regional Council woulH agree to convert the Primary School to
community facilites for the Halls committee and demolish the badly 
deteriorating police section of the Halls, This compromise, 
however, was refused by the Management Committee on the grounds that;
(1) Gairbraid Primary School was not the Burgh Hall, 
and it was the latter's use as a community facility 
that was requested; and
(2) the school had no hall.
This led to a further offer being struck that a sports hall could be 
built in the playground of the school (costing £250,000),
The management committee of the Burgh Hall rejected the offer, 
stating that it was not an option and was merely foistering off 
community groups.
On September 15th 1979 the Policy and Resource Committee decided 
to take no action and rejected the continued funding of the project.
This was followed almost two weeks later by a request to the Director 
of DARS to consider demolition of the original police station.
By this time the Burgh Halls Committee felt they had been let 
down by the Region. Such a feeling seemed justified at the time 
particularly with the dramatic increase in the estimated renovation 
costs which relate directly to the original severe underestimation 
of the costs in the first place* However, it also signifies the 
intransigence of the Halls Committee by not considering the alternatives 
of the situations which were proposed, perhaps being rather over 
zealous in their fight for the Burgh Hall and overestimating the
n
support of the Regional ouncil.
After the events in 1979 the Burgh Hall's Committee decided to 
"go it alone". It was decided to form it into a charitable trust 
to obtain rates relief and generally reduce costs. The Region 
owned building was bought by ANTOR Ltd, a company set up through 
the Burgh Halls Management Committee for £100.
The Regional ^ouncil used the Gairbraid Primary School for a 
community centre for other local groups in the area through the 
community education section in June 1930, The two developments 
developed separately from each other and antagonisms developed 
between the two and between the community groups that used them. The 
Burgh Hall’s Community Trust (status was granted in 1981) became only 
one of many groups in the area. Thus with the Region commitment, 
through Community Education,transferred to Gairbraid, the Trust had 
to look elsewhere for financial support.
After a 3 years lease was granted to the Trust, the Trust drew 
up its own costs on the refurbishment of the building amounting to 
one-tenth of the Region’s costs. Some behind-the-scene actions were 
also taking place at this time. Local politicians still supported 
the historical significance of the building. Jim Craigen MP had 
written to Malcolm Rifkind (Minister for Home Affairs and the 
Environment) in an attempt to find out if the Burgh Hall could be 
classed as a listed building. In 1980, it was given B-Listed status. 
Treasurer Gray (now Provost Gray) was in touch with the Regional 
members to assess what was happening in the situation and no doubt 
being aware of the costs asked for a full feasibility study to be 
carried out before any applications be processed on behalf of the 
Trust through the District Councii.
Considerable controversy occurred over the future of the project 
to which Glasgow District responded by giving the Trust £22,500 from 
the Maryhill Corridor Fund and an MSC grant to carry out basic 
repairs. This event was reported in the press stating how the 
Burgh Halls had been saved.
Nevertheless, considerable doubt remained. Lawrence McGarry 
was an important figure-head in attempting to ”move” things as 
quickly as possible ie. by going ahead with the Trust, and the 
feasibility study costing £302,325 carried out by architects and 
surveyors approved by the Trust. Such a sum, however, was seen as 
excessive particularly since the Scottish Development Department had
recently published a circular (7/81) stating limitations that were 
to be placed on grants. Thus, it was decided to concentrate on the 
Hall itself. The feasibility study was finished early in 1984 and 
the Trust has now applied to the Region again after the prohibitive 
costs for the survey were rejected by the District Council.
Considerable political support through politicians was exerted 
to achieve progress on the project. However, as we have seen 
changing circumstances and the important conflicts of interest which 
emerged resulted in a failure of the negotiation process. The project 
has been sustained through acquiring additional financial resources 
from different sources and mainly through local politicians who 
recognise the historical significance of the building. In effect 
the basic difference was between the value attached to the building 
by the community groups involved, and in the Region situation, the 
desire for a community centre as part of their deprivation policy but 
within the strict financial parameters governing the situation.
CASE STUDY 3 (COMMERCIAL) - CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
TAGGARTS MOTOR COMPANY (PHASE 1)
DATE
July 1980 
July 1980 
February 1981 
February 1981 
March 1981 
March 1981
March 1981 
March 1981 
November 1981 
December 1981
March 1981 
April 1982
EVENT
Interest expressed by Taggarts in site to 
City Estates Surveyor.
Planning Department introduce possibility 
of Strathclyde Regional Council giving up site.
Firm proposals from Taggarts to Estates 
Department and Planning Department.
Firm proposals from Planning Department to 
Strathclyde Regional Council.
Agreement from Cleansing Department giving 
up site for new public convenience.
Meeting with Strathclyde Region and Glasgow 
District to discuss Taggarts Development. 
Strathclyde Region give up site for area on 
Trossachs St.
Compulsory Purchase Order Promoted.
Application from Taggarts received (outline)
Reserved matters received.
Compulsory Purchase Order confirmed by 
Secretary of State.
Date of entry from Compulsory Purchase Order
Scottish Development Agency agree to site 
consolidation.
(c) CASE STUDY 3 (COMMERCIAL) - Taggarts Motor Company (Phase 1)
One of the growing concerns in the Corri(jor Project was the need 
to develop local commercial and industrial activity and encourage 
this through local extreprengurs. The Taggarts case study (Taggarts 
is a car dealing company for British Leyland) provides an example of 
this activity within the context of the Development Plan.
It has been the case that many groups, individuals and agencies 
tend to be involved in the activities discussed earlier. The Taggarts 
example is no exception to this. It should be noted that the site 
is within the boundaries of the Kelvin Local Plan which was the first
local plan to be adopted in 1978 (Fig 7). As such most of the
proposals for the area had already been identified and it was assumed 
that the "implementation" of these proposals was the main objective. 
Hiis, as was noted earlier, resulted in the formation of the Kelvin 
Implementation Review Group, formed to oversee the implementation of 
the plan.
It has already been noted that the "plan" as a tool of implement­
ation has been only part of the input to the subsequent developments
that have taken place in the area and that, from the evidence, an
over-reliance has been placed on the "plan" as the means to various 
defined proposals.
Tkggarts has been chosen as a case study primarily because it 
shows how dynamic are the processes of implementation and how 
original ideas which have been accepted by many groups and individuals 
are modified to suit changing circumstances, attitudes and events.
The focus is therefore placed on how action is achieved rather than 
translating policy/plan aims into action.
For the purpose of this case study the site which has been 
identified is located in figure 8. The site is on the east side of 
Maryhill Road adjacent to the Community Central Halls. Within the 
Kelvin Local Flan the site had already been programmed as an 
extension to the St Columba of Iona Secondary School's playing fields
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as part of the emphasis in the local plan on the provision of open 
space (Plate 5)* Included within the site there were also proposals 
for housing association new build and district council rehabilitation.
The original site, however, was not vacant to begin with such 
that located in the area were;
(1) Queens Cross Adventure Playground
(2) The Salvation Army Hall
(3) A Clydesdale Bank
as well as a proposal for a public convenience on part of the site.
It was stated in the Kelvin Local Plan, that the minimum total 
area for the playing fields was 5*63 hectares and a proposal was put 
forward that the school site be increased by 3*^5 hectares to a 
total of 5.96hectares.
The Adventure Playground had been initiated in August 1977 
when an urban aid application was approved with a capital cost of 
l-2,500. The latter had its roots in the Queens Cross Action Campaign 
(1976) and was originally located in Kirkland Street, but due to new 
housing developments (the Kirkland Street/Raeberry Street - development) 
was relocated to within the site denoted. Despite considerable 
expenditure the project never came to fruition and was faced with 
many difficulties with both staff and site. This was partly the 
reason why the project was monitored by the Social Work Department.
In July 1980, Taggarts expressed their interest in part of the 
site to the Estates Surveyor at Glasgow District. Ihis was 
subsequently passed on to the planning department and a proposal was 
put forward in the event that Strathclyde Region would give up the 
site which they owned.
The above represents the formal channels which were gone 
through in order to establish firm proposals. Also located on the 
site was a taxi business linked to British Leyland owned by a
I - /
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Mr Paton who was subsequently to become the Managing Director of 
the Taggarts development. This business was the largest producer 
of taxis in the West of Scotland. For years, Mr Paton had been asking 
. for land to develop his business. Because of the allocation of 
the land on the site for playing fields this was never obtained. 
However, pressure was put on Mr Paton by Taggarts and British Leyland 
stressing the need for modernisation to his premises as the property 
he was located on at present was well below standard.
He was eventually offered a site by the District Council on 
Dixon Blazes, an industrial estate on the south side of the city 
but declined the offer. This was followed by an ultimatum that if 
he did not get the provision of a site in the area he would leave 
the city altogether.
By this time (the beginning of 1981) the country was well into 
the depths of recession and unemployment was growing steadily, while 
businesses were declining, particularly in inner city locations.
These concerns were figuring prominently nationwide and this was 
compounded in the Glasgow situation by an increasing emphasis on 
industrial and employment aspects relating to the city particularly 
supported by the Town Clerk Depute, Theo Crombie and the District's 
Co-ordinator from the Scottish Economic Planning Department. This 
emphasis continued under the Joint Co-ordinator in 1982.
Earlier it was suggested that the adventure playground which 
was located on the site was undergoing severe difficulties which 
were causing concern amongst local people and the local Regional 
councillor, John Gray. This may be the reason why the Community 
Development Services Committee asked the Social Work Department to 
report regularly on the project. There was obvious disharmony 
between local people, Officials and those who were running the 
Project and this provided good grounds on which to call its future 
into question and allow the Taggarts site to be developed.
The Salvation Array Hall was able to be relocated as was the 
Clydesdale Bank. The proposal for the public convenience was able
to be dealt with through a proposal to locate a new convenience 
adjacent to the site. The proposals for District Council 
rehabilitation and Housing association naw build were abandoned, the 
land being acquired for the playing fields development which was to 
be decreased through the location of the Taggarts development on 
the site.
However, the most important negotiations were to be over the 
Taggarts site and the original proposal to locate playing fields on 
the site.
The playing fields had been identified as an important need in 
the area by the Local Plan and had been part of a long running 
problem over the allocation of open space in the area. Thus, there 
seemed no doubt that the playing fields would go ahead and as such a 
compromise had to be found over what was basically a conflict of 
interests.
Firm proposals were obtained from Taggarts to the estates 
department and subsequently the Planning department in F e b r u a r y  1981 
and these were subsequently passed to Strathclyde Region. The 
District Council owned the site for the playing fields and in order 
to accommodate the Taggarts site the boundaries would have to be 
redrawn. Therefore for the Region to go-ahead with the playing fields, 
this would entail them having to promote a Compulsory Purchase Order 
(CPO) on the District Council. The Region agreed to give up part 
of the site of the playing fields original .site (Fig 8), taking the 
site on Trossachs Street where the proposed housing association new 
build would take place, but was negotiated out of the development.
After agreement was reached on a personal level between.the District's 
Chief Executive, Steven Hamilton and the Region's Chief Executive, 
Robert Calderwood, the District promoted the CPO for the Region easing 
confirmation to be given by the Secretary of State in November 1981.
Meanwhile, Taggarts submitted an application for outline planning 
permission in March 1981 when the CPO was promoted. After the date 
of entry was confirmed a year later (March 1982), the Scottish
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Development Agency subsequently agreed to site consolidation of 
the area.
Thus the expansion of Taggarts Motor Company was achieved with 
the help of a District Council CPO, ground consolidation by the SDA, 
co-operation from the Regional Council in redefining the layout of the 
school playing fields, and from the Queens Cross Housing Association 
in giving up a proposed new build site (£late 6).
Intensive lobbying had to take place during 1981/82 to ensure 
that the work on the playing fields was programmed by the SDA and 
intensive lobbying during 1982 to ensure that the increased costs, 
because it was a long running problem, could be met through the 
Urban Programme. Various measures to speed up the acquisition 
procedures were taken including assistance by staff of the Urban 
Renewal Unit in the Scottish Development in dealing with the Scottish 
Education Department, to agree to the site proposals.
There 6eems little doubt that the overriding factor was the 
creation of employment and the retention of economic activity in the 
area particularly since other large manufacturing companies, 
including Bryant and May" had already closed down. It had been 
suggested that the Taggarts development would create over 100 jobs. 
Whether this was the case or not was not as important as the intention 
that it would, with Mr Paton, Managing Director of the Taggarts 
development, the threat of locating outside Maryhill, never mind the 
city, would have important implications for employment in tlie area.
This case study highlights the importance of less formal contacts 
and intentions, which were not part of the local plan. In effect 
this represented an attempt to respond to an opportunity while at 
the same time,through different individuals and agencies, directing 
the development through a process of negotiation and bargaining 
to accommodate different interests.
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CASE STUDY k (HOUSING) - CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
DATE
April 1976 
June 1978
June 1979 
March 1980
March 1982
April 1982 
April 1982 
May 1982
June 1982
October 1982
November 19^2
December 1982 
February 1983 
April 1983 
July 1983
January 198*f 
February 198*f
KIRKLAND ST / RAEBERRY ST DEVELOPMENT 
EVENT
Compulsory Purchase Order submitted on site 
by Glasgow District Council
Project design brief by City Architect approved
Redevelopment Assistance Programme introduced
Scottish Special Housing Association (SSHA) start 
negotiations over development 
Project design under way
SSHA unwilling to develop site 3 and. unwilling 
to include shops design brief.
Meeting to discuss shops and site 3
Reports sent to Housing Committee
Deletion of site 3 from design brief of SSHA 
and proposed to market site sepeirately. Two 
schemes to be prepared by SSHA (with and without 
shops)•
Details of SSHA schemes completed. Concern by 
Planning Department (District) over aspects of 
design.
Housing Committee agreed to delete shops at 
Wilton St / Maryhill Rd. Site 3 marketed.
Planning Applications submitted for SSHA 
development
Offer submitted by Barrats for site 3
Revised offer by Barrats submitted
Planning application approved for SSHA scheme
Planning application submitted by Barrats for 
site 3*
Application by Barrats approved 
Start made on SSHA scheme
(d) CASE STUDY k (HOUSING) - Kirkland St/Raeberr.y St
Development
During the years prior to the establishment of the Project, 
considerable changes had occurred in the provision of housing 
within the Corridor area through large scale demolition, resulting 
in many gap sites. Many new housing developments both public and 
private have since been undertaken. On top of this the scale of 
housing development envisaged for the area at the inception of the 
Maryhill Corridor Project was striking with large programmes of 
rehabilitation (3*500 houses) and new build (2,500 houses) - an 
increase of nearly 20% to the existing housing stock most of which 
would be carried out by Glasgow District Council and local housing 
associations under the rehabilitation schemes.
With such a scale of development envisaged, the major function 
of the Maryhill Corridor Project in influencing the provision of 
housing within the Corridor area wan quite clearly seen as to progress 
with the numerous schemes that were around. There was a very 
complicated environment as far as housing was concerned with Planning, 
Estates, Housing, SSHA etc. all involved and challenges from the 
Commerce and Industry groups on the use of land was putting pressure 
on developments. The change of administration in 1979 and the 
pressure for increased reduction in public expenditure that followed 
put the commitment to these schemes to the test.
Although the emphasis was changing towards the rehabilitation 
of properties, numerous vacant sites had been produced which became 
an important priority in the Corridor Project - Certainly if these 
sites could be developed it would do much to change the derelict 
nature of the southern end of Maryhill in particular.
Housing is obviously a main priority in any local plan. The 
adopted Kelvin Local Plan in 1978, earmarked numerous sites for 
redevelopment which were incorporated into the Development Plan in 
1979. These were to be carried out by Glasgow District in large
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part, including the development in Kirkland Street/Raeberry St. It 
was also clear from the local plan that there was an underrepresent­
ation of housing for the elderly, 2 person householders and family 
homes with gardens. The latter were to have an important effect on 
the type of housing constructed by the District Council and housing 
associations.
The Kirkland St/Raeberry St development was designated, with 
numerous other sites for redevelopment. The case study, like the 
other development, was programmed in the Maryhill ^orridor Project 
Capital Programme in 1978. Previously, however, a Compulsory 
Purchase Order (CPO) had been submitted in April 1976 and approved 
a year later in December 1977 for the case study development. A 
temporary landscape was provided by the newly formed Scottish 
Development Agency and the District's Park department, with the 
Project design brief by the City Architect approved on 22 June 1978.
Just 2 months later the Corridor Project began. However, 
although the future looked bright for the Corridor Project, this was 
not the case in the housing arena. This was mainly due to he 
increasing expenditure cuts in capital programmes and the fact that 
housing was funded through mainline budgets and of such large amounts 
that any decrease in funds or rumours that they may be cut could 
result in delay or the scrapping of projects altogether. As far as 
the Kirkland St/Raeberry St development was concerned (a district 
council project) considerable uncertainty lay over whether the 
project would go ahead or not. However, as will be seen, much more 
subtle political factors were to be responsible for the actual 
development (Plates 7 and 8).
The area which this case study is concerned with is marked in 
figure 9* The area borders on to the west side of Maryhill Road 
and is subdivided into three sections as it is in reality, but this 
is mainly for the purpose of describing the implementation of the 
development which in large part relates to the physical nature of 
the site.
P l a t e  7 . -  The new l o c a t i o n  of  shop uni ts w i t h i n  t he  B a r r a t t s  
d e v e l o p m e n t  on R a e b e r r y  St .
P l a t e  8. -  P a r t  of  t he  s i t e  d e v e l o p e d  by t he  S c o t t i s h  
S p e c i a l  H o u s i n g  A s s o c i a t i o n .
By the time of the coming to power of the Conservative 
government in 1979, the capital allocations for housing were 
becoming increasingly eroded. Glasgow District and other high- 
spending authorities, it seemed, were particularly singled out in 
relation to its needs. Due to those changes in financial and more 
importantly, perhaps, political circumstances, it would be unlikely 
that the District could go ahead with many of their projects.
From the late 1970's and into the 1980's, an increasing emphasis 
was being placed on the private sector to cater for demands where 
the public sector could, mainly for financial reasons, no longer 
cope. Oombined with the need for a better mix of tenures, this 
paved the way for private developers to acquire sites. There was 
also an increasing emphasis on the voluntary sectors and "quengo- 
type" public bodies, particularly the Scottish Special Housing 
Association, a trend which had continued since the post-war period.
The important fact as regards this case study is the involvement 
of the SSHA and the role it played in taking over sites for the 
District in order to proceed with redevelopment. The Kirkland St/ 
Raeberry St site was very similar to the adjacent Doncaster St site 
mentioned earlier carried out by Glasgow District, however, the 
implementation of the proposals was to be totally different. Indeed, 
if it was not for the fact that the District was unable to carry 
through this project and others, the SSHA would probably have played 
only a minor role in the Corridor, which was a predominantly Region 
and District Initiative. The inclusion of another major agency 
increased the complexity of the organisational contact and provided 
opportunities for negotiation and compromise outside the local 
authority system.
In 1979 an agreement was reached between the District Council 
and the SSHA resulting in the Redevelopment Assistance Programme.
This programme included the Council's mainstream housing programmes 
and a special needs category which in the event of the District not 
being able to fund projects, could pass them to the SSHA.
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In the late 1970's, Glasgow District was a hung council and as 
such it became difficult to proceed with projects. The difficulty 
in supporting the Initiative was one of the reasons that little 
progress was made on the Kirkland St/Raeberry St development until 
1980, After 1980, whatever the ideology of the parties concerned, 
the atmosphere was much more conducive to getting things on the move. 
With prominent members of the ^ouncil from Maryhill in key positions 
a great deal of political leverage was exerted to direct resources to 
Maryhill.
By 1980 the SSHA were negotiating for the project because they 
realised that if they were not successful they would have to lay off 
their own achitects because of the cutbacks being imposed on them.
The desire of the council to achieve progress resulted in lobbying 
through which the SSHA agreed to develop the sites and would enter 
negotiations with the District Council Planning Department.
Involvement of the SSHA basically began around mid 1980. Within the 
Planning Department plans contained in the Kelvin Local Plan (1978) 
it was stated that in accordance with Council Policy, shopping units 
were to be located on the corner of Maryhill Rd/Wilton St to 
regenerate commerical activity along Maryhill Road (Fig 9). Basically 
the intention of the planning department was to have shopping along 
Maryhill Rd and continue the "red brick" character of the buildings 
and concentrate industrial activity along the neighbouring arterial 
route, Garscube Rd.
It was stated earlier that the District Council architects had 
already prepared a brief for the development. However, this was 
composed of sketches and basic guidelines such that the SSHA, 
although having some District input in the sense that it retained 
the initial special needs complex of sheltered housing, were able to 
draw up their own design.
From the beginning of 1982, the project got underway. Through­
out the following 5 years changing circumstances and the interaction 
of different interests and procedures, by the Planning Department,
its political leaders, the SSHA and private developers were to 
combine in a process of compromise and bargaining to allow progress 
on the development.
By early 1981, after the technical details had been gone through 
on the site it was realised that it would be difficult to develop the 
3 sites. In particular, site three on the map and the southern part 
of site two were affected by subsidence due to mineworkings in the 
area. This change had an important effect on the complexion of the 
situation. In March 1982, the SSHA declared that they were unwilling 
to develop the third site. In part this represented an important 
difference between the functioning of the two public bodies, ie. the 
District and the SSHA. The SSHA felt that the undermining south of 
Raeberry St (site 3) would need a considerable amount of consolidation 
by pumping in grout such that the cost of the proportion of land 
needing grouting would be in excess of the relative size of the area 
to be developed. Such a difference probably would not have occurred 
if the District were funding the development due to the much more 
stringent cost yardsticks applying to the SSHA who were accountable 
to the Housing Corporation and ultimately central government. Around 
the same time the SSHA agreed not to develop the shop units stipulated 
by the Planning department who, however, were adamant on the original 
proposals for shopping units which was to lead to considerable 
negotiating difficulties (Fig 9)»
Running throughout these events was the Design Group formed by 
the SSHA and included 20 regular tenants who had been nominated by 
the District Council as prospective tenants for the properties in 
1981. This was the result of the Association's Council of Management 
in 1977 to approve a policy which emphasised the importance of 
tenant involvement in both the management and design of properties. 
This had emanated from the SSHA's experiences in GEAR which had 
begun 2 years earlier. Its importance in this study will be seen in 
how the relative importance of this group through the SSHA was able 
to become a bargaining tool in the negotiating process.
It was suggested earlier that there was an important requirement
for shops in the development. After the problems of the third site 
were realised, and the SSHA's objections to shopping at Wilton St/ 
Maryhill Rd due to the fact that providing the shops would mean less 
houses and that SSHA policy anyway was that there should be no shops 
under flats for security reasons and as such the planning department's 
proposals were not amenable to this kind of SSHA development. The 
alternative suggested by the SSHA was to locate shops on site 3 since 
there were other shops within walking distance to the north and south 
of the Sites.
A meeting was held in April 1982 to discuss the shops issue 
involving the newly appointed Joint Co-ordinator Richard Davies 
whose job it would be to play a vital role in the negotiating process 
between those involved. Following this meeting reports were submitted 
to the Housing Committee for assessment. The Housing Committee then 
decided that the area of subsidence (site 3) should be deleted from 
the SSHA's remit and asked for a reduced number of shops at Wilton St/ 
Maryhill Road. It was also suggested, therefore, that site 3 should 
be marketed separately and which would include shopping facilities.
The planning department, however, did not back down on the shopping 
units , which had been incorporated into the planning brief stating 
that if the shops did not go on the original site then none should 
be built at all. Hie importance of shops on the main road was, in 
the planning departments and the council's view, important in 
maintaining the "character" of the area.
The Housing committee subsequently had the political sense 
to realise the consequences if the SSHA did not develop the site 
and asked the Town Clerk's Office through Richard Davies the Joint 
Co-ordinator to negotiate with the SSHA and draw up 2 schemes, one 
with a smaller number of shops and the other without shops such that 
if the marketing of site 3 was successful the latter would be 
chosen and vice versa.
The District ^ouncil had accepted that there was a need for 
priviate housing in the area. However, private developers were not
keen on the site as they did not see a demand for it. However,
Barrats had already developed much of the area along Raeberry St 
constructing over 300 houses in the area, such that if anyone would 
develop the site, Barrats would be the chief candidate.
In October 1982, Barrats submitted their offer to. develop 
site 3 to the District Council. Once a user for the site had been 
found, the Housing Committee agreed to delete the shopping from the 
SSHA sites after a meeting with senior politicians and officials.
When the final date for offers had been reached on 3 December 19&2, 
Barrats had only submitted an application which included houses 
only. With the brief not met ie. no shops, Barrats were asked to 
re-submit their application, this time with shops included.
In the meantime, the SSHA were going ahead with their brief 
for the 2 sites and were encountering delays with the planning 
department over design considerations. These delays included the 
type and colour of brick to be used (since the planning department 
desired "red brick" gill along Maryhill Rd), the detailing of the 
bay windows and whether the building frontage should face towards 
Maryhill Rd or not. Such difficulties on technical standardSresulted 
in the need for bargaining.
Perhaps the most important conflicts of interest which was to
have a bearing on implementation was the aspect of the houses
themselves. The Planning department required the houses to face
away from Maryhill Rd, for reasons of safety and in line with the
adjacent District Council development in Doncaster St. However,
through the Design Group of tenants mentioned earlier, a request
was made that the front entrances and livingrooms should face onto
Maryhill Rd, a proposal which was to eventually win the day with
the backing of the SSHA. A great deal of publicity surrounded this
aspect of tenant participation in the development (Glasgow Herald 6.2*85 
P 12)
The approval for construction of the project was given in April 
1983 and a start was made on the site in February 198  ^and are now
nearing completion.
The Barrats site now became a separate issue entirely. A 
revised offer was submitted with shops along the main road frontage. 
Although this proposal satisfied the District Council, it did not 
coincide with the Roads Department "policy" at Strathclyde Region.
The Roads Department wanted the shops in Raeberry St not on the 
Maryhill Rd frontage. The Roads Department then stated that if the 
proposal to put shops on the main road was approved, they would 
serve a Roads warrant on the development as it would lead to on 
street car parking and congestion. This was an important factor 
since the "Roads Warrant" is a very powerful tool which would ensure 
that car parking on the main road would not be adopted.
Subsequently the problem had to be taken to Directorate level 
and an arrangement was eventually made that the shops should be 
located in Raeberry St to which Barrats agreed (Plate 8). The project 
was approved in January 198*+ when a start was made.
This case study serves to highlight the significance of the 
processes of bargaining and compromise which are at the heart of 
implementation processes and how, in the face of "normal", day-to-day 
difficulties opportunities can be steared towards progress on the 
development.
CHAPTER 3
PROJECT AND CASE STUDY ANALYSIS
In chapter 1 the conventional understanding of implementation 
was placed within a theoretical context. The conventional wisdom 
of the ralionalist approach was contrasted within the behavioural 
approach of examining implementation within the context of action.
This chapter attempts to pursue this avenue of looking at aspects 
of the "issues for implementation" from Chapter 1 and relate these 
to the Corridor Project and the case studies.
(a) Policy and Action
The conventional "top-down" approach to the conceptualisation 
of implementation processes has come under attack in recent years.
It has been argued that policy does not necessarily originate from 
the "top" but may be a response to pressures or problems on the 
ground or develop from specific innovations ie. where action may 
precede policy.
This chapter attempts to examine implementation processes from 
an "action-oriented" perspective which does not assume the existence 
of "a priori" assumptions about hierarchical relationships in 
relation to those involved "between policy formulation and implementa­
tion or between those making policy and those upon whom action 
depends" (Barret and Fudge 1981, p 220).
Policy is a broad statement of philosophy and general intentions 
framed in flexiable terms. It is the gap between these ;policy 
intentions and their implementations which this research intends to 
examine and seen as a negotiating process and as a process of action 
and response.
Hie Maryhill Corridor Project was a response to circumstances.
It could be argued, however, that the Project was (as was GEAR) a 
proto-type, sin experimentation of inner city policy which was being 
developed by central government at the time (White Paper on the
Inner Cities 1977)• Thus the lack of specific policy objectives 
from central government would leave the iihpLementation of proposals 
clouded in uncertainty. It could be asserted that the desire for 
central government to be involved with GEAR, and to a lesser extent 
Maryhill, was to ensure that the policy from the "top" would be 
translated in to getting things done on the ground. The success of 
the projects therefore would be seen in terms of how close they 
measured up to the postulated policy objectives, and their failure 
seen in terms of how the policy objectives became "lost11 on their 
way down from the "top” and the loss of control through this process 
of successive refinement, . This hierarchical, normative approach 
is probably how the conventional wisdom on implementation processes 
would interpret the situation.
From the perspective taken throughout this research, however, 
it seems quite clear that that is not the case. It was stated earlier 
that policy does not necessarily emerge from the "top". This would 
appear to be the case in the Maryhill Corridor Project. It was 
understood in all quarters by the mid 1970's that the problems in 
our inner cities needed immediate action. The development of the 
GEAR project then became seen as a response to pressures from below, 
although with the initiative coming from central government 
involvement through the Scottish Office and Scottish Development 
Agency. It has already been stated that central government policy 
was very unclear at this time and that the White Paper on the Inner 
Cities was just being produced.
Hie Maryhill 0Orridor was one of several areas indicated on 
a map produced by the Scottish Office from which one candidate was 
to be chosen for a special initiative. When the GEAR project was 
chosen, an opportunity existed for the local authorities and 
politicians in Glasgow to lobby for resources in other priority 
areas. The political desire existed to set up an initiative in 
response to GEAR particularly to show that local authorities were 
as capable as other government bodies at responding to inner city 
problems. The development of deprivation policy by the Regional Council
provided an opportunity to concentrate on Maryhill as one of its 
area initiatives. The District Council was eager to pursue 
developments through its local plans, the first of which was in 
Kelvin. From this complex situation it can be seen that not all 
action relates to specific policy and where policy "stops" and 
implementation "starts" may be extremely difficult to determine.
To a large extent it depends where you are standing and which way 
you are looking.
In attempting to answer the question of what factors affect the 
policy - action relationship it is important to consider the underlying 
forces (particularly economic areas) which may help or undermine projects.
The Maryhill Corridor Project was one initiative carried on the 
crest of a wave of governmental action towards the inner cities.
Peter Shore, Secretary of State for the Environment, in 1977 had 
given his commitment to providing resources for inner cities even in 
a climate where expenditure cuts would be introduced. With the 
underlying economic factors worsening and affecting the direction of 
urban policy, it would be important how those involved in the 
Initiative would respond.
Problems can also arise with policy if it is carried out at 
the "wrong"level. The ability of local authorities to solve the 
problems of deprivation in the inner cities is severely limited by 
finance and the politically adverse climate. Urns the "area focus" 
taken in Maryhill is unlikely to yield great improvements in the 
quality of life inthe inner city.
This suggests that difficulties that arise are not directly 
related to the implementation of the Project but rather that the 
policy is not focusing on the correct "targets". Of course, the 
significance of this aspect can be variously interpreted depending 
on one's ideological standpoint. If one was to suggest that 
governments (both local and central) wish nothing to be done to 
the economic forces which are destroying the inner cities except 
to show how inner cities residents are made worse off then the
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study of implementation will be of little interest. If, on the 
other hand, one sees governments making necessary incremental 
responses to large problems and using their ability to steer 
resources, then the study of implementation processes within the 
context of action becomes central to the analysis. It is the latter 
approach which is taken in this thesis.
Concern for the problems of inner cities has been voiced by 
many from central government to local community groups. The 
significant factor is how these concerns and desires for action meet. 
The Corridor Initiative has been a predominatly local authority 
initiative. The ’'policy" for tackling inner city problems therefore 
became different for Maryhill as opposed to GEAR. Considerable 
lobbying was necessary from local MPfs and senior councillors and 
officials of the two authorities in order to allow its inclusion in 
the Augmented Urban Programme.
Most of the discussion over policy would, therefore, be between 
the Region and the District to decide exactly what form the initiative 
should take. Ideas and intentions are extremely important in this 
case but they need not necessarily be translated into rational goals 
before being institutionalised. This was the case with the initial 
development of the Corridor Project where support had already been 
harnessed before the appropriate responses by the authorities and 
their department had been developed and organisational arrangements 
discussed. The Maryhill Corridor Project emerged from a complex of 
processes characterised by different groups each pursing their own 
rationality.
This, therefore, became a situation where action had |*reced&d- 
the policy in response to circumstances, which at the time were 
conducive to developing such projects. It is therefore important 
to recognise that policy is complex and ambiguous, often without 
clearly defined goals. In this case policy has tended to be 
coincidental with the implementation process ie. creating the 
Maryhill Corridor Project. Thus policy has become an expression of
intention to allow on the one hand, a corporate approach to the 
Region's area initiatives by agreeing priority for Maryhill with 
the District. For the latter, a desire to show that the District 
was as capable as the SDA in responding to the necessary urban 
renewal of the inner cities.
The continuity of a policy or project is partly determined 
through the ability of its supporters to share common ideological 
impulses which plainly the Region and District do. Obtaining 
agreement over the means, however, can lead to differences in 
response. The absence of competition for resources or the availablity 
of special programmes (eg the Augmented Urban Programme) is likely 
to decrease the chances of uncertainty.
However, the fact that the multiplicity of agencies and actors 
involved in the project having their own interests and intentions, 
can result in a situation as in the Corridor Project where continuity 
and uncertainty can exist side by side. The growth of Urban Aid and 
its priority attached to Maryhill allowed a continuity of Projects 
in the area whereas in the housing area a great deal of uncertainty 
affected housing capital allocations throughout Glasgow as a whole.
An important feature of policy is how it is modified and 
mediated over time in response to external circumstances or as a 
result of the actions and responses of those responsible for its 
execution or upon whom it is brought to bear interacting within the 
processes of negotiation and bargaining which are central to an 
understanding of implementation processes.
!Rie failure of the first Joint Co-ordinator and the resultant 
(mostly) separate arrangements was a significant aspect of the 
development of the Corridor Project. In part this was the result of 
the changed political situation at the District and the desire of 
Regional Labour Councillors not to allow political representation 
on their area management team.
Modifications also had to be made to the Regional Council's
Deprivation Policy set out in its Multiple Deprivation "Red Book" 
Document and subsequent n Areas of Need" Report.
The scale of the Initiative needed the presence of senior 
officials on the Area Management Team, with co-ordination taking 
place at a higher level, contrasting significantly with the "grass 
roots" approach of other initiatives.
Similarly requests by the Scottish Office to be involved in the 
Project after the development of the Policy Co-ordination Unit at 
the District, resulted in the appointment of a Scottish Office Secondee.
Thus policy becomes the produce of compromises rather than the 
statement of explicit goals and objectives. Policy does not exist 
in a pure form, independant of those who make or influence it.
Therefore, where policy emanates from is open to debate. In large 
part it determines the formal (and indeed informal) structure which 
direct implementation processes, and within this dynamic process, is 
subject to change continually modified through such compromises.
It is also the case that such compromises occur at different 
levels during the implementation process depending on the issue at 
hand. F0r example, the agreement over the Redevelopment Assistance 
Programme between the Scottish Special Housing Assocation and Glasgow 
District had an effect on policy by modifying it to suit changing 
requirements ie. expenditure cuts in the District's housing programmes. 
Although this agreement was reached independently of the Maryhill 
Corridor Project it had reprecussions for developments in it. Thus 
this resulted in the Kirkland St/Raeberry St housing development 
going ahead. Modification of policy influences the subsequent 
developments which take place after these changes and remain 
important. Obviously in the housing case study this involved the 
continued mediation between the District and its departments in terms 
of how, when and where projects could go ahead. The interaction of 
the different intentions of the latter resulted in the necessary 
mediation on style, aspect and content of the housing development 
as well as the SSHA's own procedures of community involvement through
their Design Group having a bearing on the mediation process.
Many policies also represent compromises between conflicting 
values. The agreement of the Redevelopment Assistance Programme 
mediated through the Scottish Office had to be negotiated through 
concessions from the District Council whereby the latter would 
release certain sites earmarked for District ^ouncil proposals for 
private use ie. housing and commercial.
It was suggested earlier that there may be no clear distinctions 
between policy and action such that it becomes very difficult to say 
whether action is influencing policy, or policy action. The 
traditional concentration on examining policy, means therefore that 
action at the ,rbottom,, has not been as important as from the "top11. 
Examining the detail of the case studies allows a clearer picture 
to emerge such as in the two community examples. In both examples, 
it was suggested that the motivation to develop both locations for 
for community use, to a large extent, lay with local politicians.
The vociferous nature of community groups in the area and, in the 
case of the Community Central Halls, those who used the facilities 
beforehand were important in campaigning for the developments.
At the same time the Region's Deprivation policy had emphasised 
the need (especially through the Worthington Report) to develop 
Communitifis,toDugh local people. However, the official's role, which 
one would, in the rationalist approach, normally associate with the 
implementation and initiation of the projects was clearly not the 
case. Thus the policy-action relationship becomes blurred to some 
extent atJ the interface of politics and administration. These 
two examples, however, did represent important local ideological 
impluses, penetrating the policy-action relationship.
It is evident from the study that a multiplicity of linkages 
exists between the actors and agencies involved in initiating and 
sustaining the Maryhill Corridor Project and developments within it. 
In initiating the project the role of key individuals such as 
Jim Craigen the local MP for Maryhill and on the official side
through the Director of Planning at the District Council, James Rae, 
to start an initiative in response to GEAR, has been extremely 
important.
During the progress of the Initiative the role of the co­
ordinator had been crucial in attracting resources to Maryhill and 
in developing linkages with political representatives at the local 
level and within the respective councils. It has been shown how 
such links were important in relation to getting things done and 
the means whereby ’’action” could be achieved.
"One of the more prevalent myths is
that planning and politics are related
but separate activities. There is the
view that politicians determine the
ends of policy while experts select
the most appropriate means. Thus politicians
are involved in value judgments
whereas officials are concerned with
factual questions about the
instruments of policy. This reflects the
fact that the choice of means itself
requires evaluation among alternatives,
but more importantly, it assumes that
means and ends are distinguishable"
(Blowers 1980 p 2)
For example, the end of creating new build and rehabilitation, 
open space and environmental improvements in Maryhill cannot be 
divorced from the means towards the political rationale of making 
Glasgow "Miles Better”. Similarly the understanding that politicians 
medce policy and officials implement it is a fallacy borne out through 
example as with the Regional Co-ordinator *s r°le in changing the 
priorities of the Education Department in chapter three. Indeed, 
the full-time role of the co-ordinators in lobbying for Maryhill and 
"persuading and harrowing" others to respond to the initiative
became a pivotal position at the interface of politics and 
administration.
The role of local councillors John Gray and Lawrence McGarry 
in the two community examples in setting up management committees 
and organising support for the projects highlights the significance 
of this blurred area between means and ends suggesting that, within 
the context of action, the latter are inseparable.
The significance of mediation and interaction between the 
two authorities and other actors and agencies adds to the complexity 
of the policy-action environment. With reorganisation in local 
government difficulties appeared in the need for agreement between 
the two tiers of government eg. over the management arrangements 
for the Maryhill Corridor Project, and thus adds to the complexity 
of determining poUcyintentions and enlarges the stage (context of 
action) upon which implementation takes place.
The multiplicity of actors and agencies involved was increased 
through the role of housing associations carrying out their own 
independant programmes as well as the Scottish Development Agency 
and a host of other "quango" bodies becoming involved in the Corridor 
Project and taking part in the negotiations with the District Council 
and Regional Council highlighted in the case studies. This further 
complicates the policy-action relationship in the sense that those 
involved were not necessarily in a hierarchical set-up and were more 
"equal" than the master, subordinate relationship which the latter 
suggests. Thus compromise between different interests becomes 
implicit within the policy-action relationships emphasisng how 
action is achieved through processes of political bargaining.
As well as this the multiplicity of agencies provided additional 
organisational and resource requirements which enabled progress to 
be made on projects.
The relation of the Initiative to the structural context is 
obviously crucial. Many commentators have suggested that local
authorities are the mere servants of central government (Robson 
1966 p 67). This proposition has been challenged by others 
(Blowers 1930, Dearlove 1973) suggesting that the dominant processes 
at a national level, hide much of the innovations and developments 
by local public bodies to direct policy and its implementation.
Blowers(1980) comments that even in situations of strong central 
control and command (as in the present adverse political and 
economic climate) the ability of local factors to influence how 
things get done, even to the contrary of national government policy 
are possible. The Maryhill Corridor Project can fit into this 
category.
However, the structural context plays a significant part in 
how "action" is construed. The general approach of the inner area 
initiatives was to be characterised by taking a comprehensive, 
future-oriented approach to problems with procedures for monitoring 
and review in order to anticipate future events and determine the 
appropriate response. Indeed, this type of "schematic planning" has 
been that which has characterised the role of the planning profession, 
in the 1970's.
Nevertheless, in the Maryhill Corridor Project, the changing 
economic climate had a profound effect on how such planning could be 
put into practice. Much of the activity proceeded along the lines 
which were to become more strictly determined by financial means.
The difficulties in obtaining urban aid funding in the later life 
of the Corridor became more significant as well as attempting to 
timetable planning procedures to "fit in" with the annual budgeting 
cycle. The Housing case study provides another example, where the 
local authority, complied with central government cuts in public 
expenditure such that some projects were postponed or abandoned 
altogether, and others eg. Kirkland St/Raeberry St have succeeded 
by obtaining resources from other sources ie. the Redevelopment 
Assistance Programme. This has to some extent replaced the 
traditional planning approach with an emphasis on pragmatic planning 
where these budgeting instruments have become more important in
the adverse political and economic climate. Thus although it has 
been remarked that progress has been made in Maryhill, this has 
been within the perceived constraints on action.
(b) The Context of Circumstances
The climate of opinions and intentions can be a very important 
factor in terms of policy and implementation. The Maryhill Corridor 
Project represents the significance of "action in the context of 
circumstance" preceding inner city policy but jumping on the band­
wagon of what was perceived to be occurring eg. the Holterman Study, 
White Paper on the Inner Cities, the GEAR project, the Augmented 
Urban Programme etc.
The development of Strathclyde Regions Deprivation Policy was 
ripe for experimentation through its area initiatives of which 
Maryhill became one. With the adoption of the first local plan 
(Kelvin) in 1978 and the characteristics it exhibited of an inner 
city area, conditions became conducive to developing the Maryhill 
Corridor, with the dominant motivation of the District Council to 
achieve the speedy implementation of proposals.
Changing circumstances also played a significant part in 
subsequent developments in the Corridor. The most important of 
these included public expenditure cuts and increased competition 
from other areas. The adverse economic climate, at the nations!, 
level, was increasingly compounded by an equally adverse political 
climate, especially towards the spending and bureaucracy of local 
authorities. The changing role of urban policy, becoming developed 
through programmes rather than clear policy objectives (Hambleton 
1981) after the Conservative government came to power and the 
creation of Urban Development Corporation under tight central 
government control were also to mitigate against the effectiveness 
of the Initiative.
If one is to take the rationalist criteria of what it terms
effectiveness, this would be in terms of policy conformance ie. 
how implementation conforms to policy objectives. If the Development 
Plan is to be taken sis the evaluative focus for the Initiative, then 
the Maryhill Corridor represents a significant under-achievement for 
those purporting the concept of the Corridor seen as a largely 
unsuccessful attempt to regenerate the inner city through marginal 
measures. This can be seen in terms of the lack of certain proposals 
to be implemented and the changes which took place in certain 
developments in terms of their eventual use and in terms of who was 
implementing the proposals.
The Corridor Project was sustained, however, in a period when 
local authorities were increasingly coming under attack. But it did 
not have the necessary central government support after the 1979 
election as in GEAR, nor the extra resources given to it primarily 
because of Scottish Office involvement with the project throughout its 
history. Neither has the Maryhill Corrid0r Project received the 
"academic" publicity that the GEAR project has (Nelson 1980, Wamop 1982, 
Bootii,Money and Pitt 1982). Urlan Wannop (1982) in his appraisal 
of the management strategy for GEAR suggests that the Maryhill set-up 
differed in two important ways;
(1) the deliberately low profile organisational 
structure and lack of strong political support; and
(2) lacked the integrated involvement of other agencies.
These aspects, it would appear, did not allow the Corridor 
Project to remain on its path of policy conformance as the GEAR 
project has. Nevertheless, this thesis is not concerned with 
questions of organisational survival but rather in how those involved 
with the project directed resources towards the "ideology" of the 
Corridor Initiative. The Maryhill Corridor Project was sustained 
through the late 1970's and early 1980's even within the unfavourable 
climate. Developments, in particular, for housing were able to go- 
ahead (albeit in a modified form) even with cuts in capital 
expenditure as shown in the housing case study; urban aid applications 
were proposed that would fit in with changes in government policy; 
the three housing associations were able to step in on rehabilitation
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proposals which could not be undertaken by the District Council; 
commercial activity through local entreprenous has gained benefits 
(Taggarts) in the face of growing unemployment and business closures.
In the context of more pragmatic criteria of plan performance, 
therefore, (ie the context of action), the Maryhill Project represents 
a significant achievement, not least since the local authorities 
achieved an important development during a period of increasing 
uncertainty. Indeed, the comments voiced by some interviewees, 
suggested that the Corridor Project became a victim of its own success 
in attracting resources.
It has been suggested that most of what took place in Maryhill 
would have taken place anyway. However, it is extremely difficult, 
ceteris paribus, to identify how effective the development would 
have been without the priority status it had. Similarly, the 
changing circumstances that ensued make it equally difficult to assess 
alternative courses of action which would have led to the same 
developments occurring. These comments tend to mitigate against the 
rational/comprehensive paradigm.
It was suggested earlier that how you look at implementation 
depends where you are standing and which way you are looking. Part 
of the function of this research is to show that the action-oriented 
approach shows that implementation and policy and the actions which 
they perpetuate occur throughout the whole process. It is important 
therefore not to see the Initiative as a Static end in itself but 
rather to see it as part of the process of action in the context 
of changing: circumstances. This is highlighted in the case studies.
The Maryhill Community Central Halls had established itself 
just prior to the Project was announced. This was an important 
factor in that urban aid had just emerged, and there was little 
competition for resources. On the contrary the later development 
of the Burgh Halls saga led, inter alia, to greater difficulties 
in obtaining funding, although progress was also hampered by 
differences in intentions between the various groups, individuals
and agencies involved.
The Taggarts case study must also be placed in its context, 
with increasing concern by the 1980's for employment.and industry 
and subsequently a much greater emphasis on safeguarding employment 
opportunities and retaining commercial activity within the local 
area.
(c) Plans and Intentions
Since the post-war period and the growth of the statutory 
planning system a great reliance has been placed on plan-making with 
the assumption that plans represent the policy which is to be 
implemented.
The study of the Corridor Project has shown that within the 
context of changing circumstances and when one looks at implementation 
from the point of view of the "implementers" and the complexity of 
actions which this necessitates has placed doubt over the utility 
of the 1'Development Plan" as proposed for the Maryhill Corridor 
Project. It was suggested that in terms of plan conformance, the 
Corridor did not represent a significant achievement. However, it 
may be wrong to judge the effectiveness of the formal plan by the 
extent to which its stated provisions are realised. It was stated 
earlier that central government, local authorities and other interest 
groups play a central part in determining the context of plans, but 
are not necessarily in agreement over either their general direction 
or their detailed realisation. In this sense, the Maryhill Corridor 
Development Plan can be seen as the dominant "technical rationality" 
which emerged from the negotiating and bargaining which took place 
between central government, local authorities, their departments and 
other public and private bodies.
The development of a plan in itself, therefore, becomes the 
outcome of the "rationalities" of different participants' interests, 
interacting in an essentially political arena, such that the plan 
becomes the result of compromise in the form of a technical
rationality at a particular point in time. The "plan" therefore is 
perhaps best seen as a "picture in time". This picture.continually 
evolves and changes over time in relation to external events and 
changes in power relationships in orgainsations and society in 
general. Objectives and aims tend to have an aura of permanency 
about them in all sorts of plans. The assumption that it is 
intentions and motivations which lie behind these, reduces their 
static nature and subjects them to change in the evolving context 
of circumstances.
The process of decision-making is therefore not discrete, but 
part of an ongoing complex of inter-related acts.
"Decisions arise from a complex 
process of interaction among actors.
All these people think themselves 
rational, and are trying to behave 
rationally for much of the time; 
but their conception of the rational 
differ. They have different goals, 
and different ways of achieving 
those goals". (Hall 1980, p 196/197)
The Maryhill Corridor Project was h.bt initiated through any 
clear, technical objectives of planners which were to become 
embodied in the development plan. It developed from the intentions 
of being actors and agencies who wished, inter alia, to show that 
"local authorities were the natural agents for regenerating inner 
cities". The "technical" justification for the Project had to be 
mediated within the dominant political rationality and responding 
to this dynamic environment throughout the duration of the Project.
It is therefore a fallacy to see the implementation of the 
Corridor Project as a single act, rather it should be seen as 
a process characterised by a multiplicity of linkages between actors 
and agencies in a variety of administrative divisions and inter-
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organisational dependancies and with a variety of interests and 
ideologies interacting through a reticular (non-linear) decision­
making process characterised by reciprocal power relations and 
negotiations.
The Housing Case Study and that of Taggarts Motor Company were 
modified aspects of the Development Plan. Just because a plan does 
not achieve what it set out to do does not mean, however, that 
planning has been ineffectual. If, as this research assumes, 
planning and planners must respond to a whole series of interests 
as well as their own and if these intentions are dynamic as suggested 
then it becomes axiomatic that in the face of future uncertainties 
will necessarily result in modifications and changes to plans.
The two case studies mentioned above highlight these aspects.
From the initial designation of the housing site to be carried out 
by the District Council, development was transferred to the SSHA 
and private developers involving a whole series 6f negotiations 
primarily as to the result of financial expediency. Similarly the 
redesignation of various proposals including the St C0lumba 
Secondary School playing fields in order to accommodate the Taggarts 
development represented another modification to the original plan 
intentions as different interests and circumstances were brought to 
bear.
(d) The Role of Individuals and Groups
It is important to recognise that scope exists for key 
individuals and groups to influence or "head" implementation 
processes at different levels. Within the context of the Maryhill 
Corridor Project it has been possible to identify such features
particularly amongst local politicians and officials of the authorities 
concerned.
It is important to recognise, however, that individuals are not 
wholly independant of wider structural issues such that they are 
"shapers” of events. Neither are they wholly secondary to them.
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This assumption necessitates some qualification.By assuming that 
individuals and groups have a significant effect on policy change it 
is important to take cognisance of the structural and political 
context in which action occurs. The uncertainties and changes which 
characterise implementation processes, which were identified earlier, 
must also be seen as limiting factors on the role of individuals and 
groups. Nevertheless, it is asserted that opportunities can emerge, 
which call be used to effect change or innovation. It is also 
important to recognise that such developments may include bargaining 
and negotiations to produce compromises.
The example in chapter three, concerning the Regional Co­
ordinators and the role of the Area Management Teams attempt to 
change the Education Department priorities becomes highly significant 
here. The team had no read control over the functioning of other 
department^,however,finance is only is one aspect of power. The 
seniority of officials on the Team and the role of the co-ordihator 
as "mini1’ Chief Executive as well as the important political 
representation through the Policy and Resources Representative made 
this group very influential on issues concerning Maryhill. In 
particular, the role of the co-ordinator in obtaining the necessary 
support from members on the Team and that of the Policy and Resources 
Representative, John Gray, and his pursual of this modification to the 
Policy and Resources Committee itself against the views of the Education 
Departmentrepresent a significant aspect of political bargaining 
benefiting the ideology of Maryhill.
"Organisations are neither the rational, 
harmonious entities celebrated in managerial 
theory nor the arenas of apocalyptic class 
conflict projected by Marxists. Rather, it 
may be argued, a more suitable notion lies 
somewhere between the two, a concept of 
organisation as politically negotiated orders.
Adopting this view, we can observe organisational 
actors in their daily transactions perpetually 
bargaining, repeatedly forming and reforming
conditions, and constantly availing themselves 
of influence tactics. Few organisational actors 
are the totally passive, apolitical entities 
that are presented by industrial psychologists 
and organisational sociologists".
(Eacharach and Lawler 1980 p 1)
The above example concerning the Education Department shows how 
the "technical" rationalty of the latter were to be modified in the 
wider "political" rationality where much of the negotiation takes 
place, and where in this case individual pressure from the co-ordinator 
to justify the change in priorities succeeded within the organisational 
context.
The role of individuals and groups also varies in relation to 
different factors. The significance of values, interests and 
ideologies (discussed more fully in the next section) is combined in 
Young's (1979) notion of "assumptive worlds" which have a mediating 
effect on the technical rationality of the planning process. These 
factors are also important at different levels of the implementation 
process.
The role of the local Regional Gouncillor for North Kelvinside, 
John Gray, who incidentally was also the Policy and Resources 
Representative for the Initiative, played a very influential role 
in operating and pursuing progress on the community Central Halls 
project and who spearheaded the initiation of the Action Committee 
as well els using his position and access to higher level Officials 
through other councillors to "bend" the local plEin to accommodate 
the Halls projects. Similarly, in the actual negotiations over 
the purchase of the Hall and the conditions over its use, (which 
could have stopped progress in its tracks) the role of John Gray 
was totally instrumental in compromising and developing bargaining 
procedures. In slLI, his ability to draw together the various interests 
which had to be involved in the bargaining process represents a 
remsirkable achievement through the individuals perceptions of his 
role as local representative Eind his own pEirticular interests in the
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problems of deprivation.
At a higher level the individual influence of John Craigen MP 
for Maryhill and Neil Carmichael MP whose constituency boundary 
included part of the Corridor before the boundary changes and who 
was instrumental in fostering commitment for the Initiative through 
the Scottish Office became crucial in obtaining funds and in lobbying 
through Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District for the Project. This 
highlights the significance of informal contacts between individual 
and groups which emphasise the key roles of the latter in developing 
the Gorridor Project.
Therefore, it has been suggested that those people involved in 
implementation does not necessarily reflect the formal organisational 
structure. 33ie Housing Core Group mentioned in chapter three 
emphasised the key position of Maryhill Councillors in this formal 
subcommittee and its importance in *getting things done* as one 
councillor put it. However, there also existed significant informal 
contacts between these councillors who could bargain over proposals 
due to the position they had. Kieir links with local organisations 
such as housing associations also represented important contacts 
and additional resource requirements.
The ways in which individuals, groups or agencies work together
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in implementing policies and plans can be described as "creating11 
or ""forging"1 new "chains" between policy and action.
The Area Mangement Teams of theRegional council and the Maryhill 
Corridor Working Party of the District Council and the subgroups 
derived from them (particularly the G0mmerce and Industry Groups) as
well as the roles of those discussed above provided an important means 
of creating networks of activities and actions that interrelated to 
carry out a programme of action. The informal relationships that 
developed in these groups and particularly between officials and 
councillors had an important effect on the context of action. This 
can be seen in that the organisational reality to which actors
carrying out a particular policy or programme refer is not just the 
formal organisational structure but what Hjern and Porter (1980) term 
the ’’implementation structure".
Within Maryhill and between Maryhill and the local authorities 
in particular placed the various formal groups where the different 
technical rationalities could be mediated in the political arena 
through local politicians and key officials.
The role of the co-ordinators in this respect was crucial.
They tend, in the case of the Regional Co-ordinators and subsequent 
Joint Co-ordinators, to become amorphous characters both political 
(in the sense of bargaining and negotiating over resources) and 
administrative (in terms of progress-chasing) which had an important 
effect in sustaining the "ideology" of the Maryhill Corridor.
The pivotal positions of the co-ordinator outlined through the 
characteristics described in chapter three and the examples and case 
studies has shown the much greater "action space" they have been 
able to work in and have taken advantage of the ability to effect 
"entreprenuial activity" (Hill 1981) in pursuit of their full-time 
commitment to the Maryhill Corridor Project.
This also applies to the role of local councillors in the 
evidence provided in harnessing support from local entrepreneurs 
and community groups to dealing at higher levels in the two 
authorities. An important remark that emerged from the interviews 
was that the local councillors tended to be "your above average 
councillor".
The most important factor to emerge from the role of individuals 
and groups in influencing developments in Maryhill is that they 
tended to be located at the highly versatile interface between 
politics and administration such that the latter did not become 
distinct but part of an ongoing series of interrelated acts.
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(e) Values, Interests and Ideologies
With the analysis of the Corridor Project and how it relates to 
the wider social context and individual involvement, it becomes 
necessary to examine what actually took place there and why. It 
has been seen how policy, of the Region's Area Initiatives, of the 
District Development Plan and central governments response to the 
inner cities, has been modified and mediated within the context of 
action. It is therefore legitimate to postulate that as policy
moves away from the centre and becomes more dispersed such features
of implementation processes eg. political bargaining continue to 
have an effect:
"it is only when you move outward from
the core (of policy consensus) to deal
with how this should be done, what 
resources should be devoted.•.and so 
on that interest conflicts are 
encountered" (Barret and Hill (198*0 p 236)
This section looks at the micro-level of implementation 
processes in greater detail examining how the various individuals 
groups, departments and agencies concerned and their different 
interests, values* and ideologies interact through negotiating and 
bargaining. The inclusion of values is a significant diversion 
from the rationalist paradigm. It is important to acknowledge these 
aspects of this action-oriented approach since the resolution of 
interests through the processes of political bargaining identified 
involves a distribution of costs and benefits. The action-oriented 
approach is concerned here with the boundaries or margins of 
professions not their central parts. The concern is perhaps for 
what they all lack - a realisation that an .understanding of their 
interconnectedness; an interrelatedness which cannot be divorced from 
the social system of which they form a part.
The ability to bargain is determined by different factors, one 
of the most important of which is power. Power can be defined in
many ways eg. organisational status, political status, influence, 
professional ideologies, access to information etc. The important 
fact to recognise in this thesis is that these are important 
characteristics of implementation processes which determine the out­
puts of decision-making processes.
Blowers (l98o)suggests that;
"The power to make policy and to attempt 
to effect it is formally in the hands of the 
elected representatives who constitute a 
planning committee. In reality this power is -
confined to a small group of politicians and 
officials". (p*0
and he goes on to suggest that;
"the power to implement however is much 
more dispersed" (p *f)
The rational, normative approach would suggest the need, there­
fore, to exert control over policy as it moves away from the centre 
in order that its implementation can conform to the original 
intentions. This, therefore, assumes that such control can be exerted, 
probably within an unitary, hierarchical structure in which commands 
can be transferred to successively lower levels until it is "on the 
ground". However, as Hood (1976) suggests the further away one moves 
from unitary organisational solution to a problem, the more likely 
are co-ordination difficulties to arise". In reality, as in the 
Corridor Project, a multiplicity of actors and agencies have been 
recognised having their own interests and not necessarily in a 
hierarchical set-up. Therefore as Pressman and Wildavsky suggest;
"decision-makers become forced to gain consent 
(for proposals) through a system of multiple 
'clearances ', a process fraught with diplomatic 
problems often defeating the best intentions of
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change agents” (Pressman andWildavsky "1973i P^3)
Compromise is therefore seen, through this perspective, as policy 
failure, -^ his research, however, takes a different perspective of 
such difficulties by focusing on the action of decision-making itself 
and relating this to the wider context in which those decisions have 
meaning, rather than attempting to identify a single, linear process 
of cause and effect. Compromise and bargaining therefore became 
central to the analysis of implementation processes.
The question of interests is one which has important implications 
for understanding action. Although consensus can be achieved over many 
things, conflicts are also likely to arise. The Burgh Halls case 
study is evidence of a conflict of interests which occurred between 
the Halls Committee and the Regional ^ouncil and related departments.
The desire by the Halls Committee to retain the Burgh Hall and 
adjacent police station as part of the heritage of Maryhill was 
paramount. To the Regional ^ouncil and its deprivation policy 
through its co-ordinators and management arrangements was to ensure 
the development of community facilities as its primary aim. The 
agreement achieved by the successful application for urban aid would 
provide the means to ensure both interests were served.
The fact that those interests were not achieved in the way 
intended represented a failure of the negotiation and bargaining 
process which is at the heart of implementation processes. The 
failure of this process cannot be viewed as a lack of control since 
those involved eg. community groups, local politicians were not in a 
hierarchical fcttttiations. Compromises, as we have seen, were proposed 
but these were not acceptable to the Burgh Halls Committee. As the 
situation became more complex and other factors came into play eg. 
one-roof leisure centre, other community groups etc delay became 
significant which pressured the Regional Council into making a decision. 
The intention of the Region was to develop a community facility for 
the area, the intention of the Halls Committee was primarily to retain 
the Burgh Halls building as well as its use as a community focus.
The failure of the negotiation process resulted in a move to 
the centre through the Policy and Resources Subcommittee who 
eventually delivered the ultimatum which resulted in the Halls 
Committee "going it alone". Therefore, the unresolved conflict of 
interests, raised the level of negotiations into what Self (1972) 
terms "the zone of administrative politics" composed of leading 
members and officials dealing with aspects of policy. The decision 
not to make progress on the Burgh Halls was not publicly announced, 
nevertheless, very powerful subcommittee such as that of Policy and 
Resources made significant, yet unnoticed decisions.
The ^urgh Halls case study contrasts v/ith that of the Community 
Central Halls where (although the circumstances were different) the 
objective was basically thesame; this time spearheaded by the local 
Regional concxllor who formed the Action Committee w^° i^ac^ 
important links with the community and at high levels in the local 
authorities. In this case the close links that developed between 
the Region and the Central Halls enabled a successful negotiation over 
the projects satisfying the interests of the Council as a facility 
for community development and for the community groups, the 
opportunity to run a local facility.
It is important to gain agreement over the resources needed to 
sustain a project. It is possible to gain such a commitment through 
formal means ie. the Redevelopment Assistance Programme or through 
personal, political or professional influence ie. contact between 
councillors, officials, local people etc. To gain the necessary 
support the "providers” must commit themselves to achieving certain 
objectives regarded as valuable, or at least acceptable, by those 
controlling the resources they need and usually involving compromises 
between the different interests involved eg. the release of sites 
by the District Gouncil in obtaining agreement over the Redevelopment 
Assistance Programme. The role of the local Regional councillor and 
of the management committee in the Community Central Halls case study 
enabled a commitment to be given for resources to the project. The 
objectives of the "providers", ie. the Community Central Halls, to
develop the Halls as a unique community development project were 
regarded as "valuable" to the Region’s deprivation Policy, and in 
part carried out the role of the ^ouncil in the area in this respect. 
Such a compromise was not achieved in the Bugh Halls which partly 
accounts for the impasse between the Burgh Halls Committee and the 
Regional Council, largely constrained by financial expediency*
This raises important questions and dilemmas. The lack of 
involvement of actors and agencies in programmes may be due to where 
they define the boundaries of concern rather than how they fit into 
practical problems ie. the departments view. This is evidenced in 
the lack of acceptance of responsibility for the administration of the 
funding for the Burgh Halls by Community Education and in the 
difficulties encountered in the Community Work Management Group 
(Chapter Three) in terms of how far and to what extent each department 
should be involved.
Professional ideologies and values can also play an important 
part in the processes of negotiation and bargaining in implementation 
processes. Plainly, this was the case in the Kirkland St housing 
development where a clash of interests occurred between the SSHA, 
the Design Group and the District Council Planning Department. The 
conflicts over shops in the design brief by the Council and the 
SSHA’s desire to build more houses and its own policy against having 
homes above shopsshow up such values. The Planning departments 
views were based on an attempt to re-establish the traditional 
thoroughfare of Maryhill Road as part of its strategy for the 
Maryhill Corridor. The conflicts over these professional values 
continued in relation to the design and aspect of the construction in 
which the interests of the Design Group were brought to bear, 
resulting in the latter and the SSHA winning the day. However, to 
a large extent, these differences in values and interests were 
superceded by the need for progress on projects such that the success 
of the’Ideology" of the Corridor Project became more important which 
was supported by the councillors on the Housing Committee and the 
Joint co-ordinator.
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The Taggarts* case study highlights the increasing importance 
of the value placed on creating employment opportunities and 
generating local commercial activity in the early 1980*s. The 
prospect of creating over 100 jobs in phase I of the development 
and perhaps another 100 in phase II laid heavily on the minds of 
the decision-makers resulting in the modifications of proposals for 
that part of the Kelvin Local Plan, to accommodate the Taggarts* 
Development.
The failure of the Community Work Management Group can also 
be viewed in terms of conflicts over values and ideologies held by 
the various participants. The ideological bias of the reports of the 
community workers which were seen to articulate their own views of 
the communities' needs clashed with those of the senior departmental 
representatives from the Housing department, in particular, who were 
on the Group.
It was suggested earlier that a great deal of significance should 
be attached to the key role of the co-ordinators. The individuals 
concerned obviously have a specific "action Space" in which to work 
but they represent a potentially highly flexible, dynamic and pivotal 
position. How they approach their tasks will depend on their 
"assumptive worlds" mentioned earlier. The position is a unique one, 
with no particular allegiance to any department within their respective 
authorities, but committed to the Initiative which they are co­
ordinating.
In effect, the "ideology" of the Corridor Project became dominant. 
Together with the local councillors and senior officials attempts 
were made to influence or change the behaviour of others to get things 
implemented; and others responding according to whether the desired 
action would fit in with or further their own interests. These 
processes, however, take place throughout the policy-action relation­
ships. The lack of District political representation on the Regions 
Area Management Team during the hung council is evidence of this as 
is the bargaining over the Policy Co-ordination Unit between the 
District and the Scottish Office, with the former developing its own
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interests while at the same time compromising over the secondment of 
a Scottish Office official to the unit.
What seems clear from the foregoing discussion is that uncertainty 
about the future can encourage innovation and adjustment to change. 
Throughout the analysis one can identify many cases where the inter­
action of values, interests and ideologies becomes important where 
conflicts emerge. Such conflicts over resources, ideologies and 
power struggles are not distinct activities but evolve together as 
different aspects of a continuing process of negotiation, bargaining 
and compromise in the political arena,
(f) Conclusions
The study of implementation is problematic. How we view the 
facts about implementation will partly depend on how we conceive of 
implementation which in itself cannot be settled by observation.
It also depends on how you interpret case studies. The case of 
an action-oriented approach focuses on a particular conceptualisation 
of implementation processes.
It is difficult to unravel how far the policy-action relationship; 
can be explained by the influence and the interests-power structure 
in society, how far it is the product of "bureaucratic politics" and 
how far it is formed by professional and administrative values and 
how these interrelate.
This research has concluded that policy and plans are never 
static ends in themselves and that they are liable to be modified 
and mediated through processes of political bargaining. The sheer 
complexity of linkages, interrelationships in decision-making at 
different levels, scales and times affects intentions and expectations 
adds to the difficulty in attaining control over policy and its 
implementation. The perspective of this research has been to 
emphasise policy or plan performance such that negotiation and
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compromise became essential features of the policy-action relationship.
The plurality of interests, values and ideologies and the 
particular power relationships in which they interact became crucial 
factors in the mediation process. This has an effect all through 
the policy-action relationship.
Within this context it is suggested that certainkey individuals 
and groups characterised in different ways by the features above, 
are able to exert influence on the context of circumstances and 
relations which exist at a particular point in time to "bend” 
programmes towards their specific intentions.
Another feature of this research has been to show that the 
formal aspects of the statutory planning system are not necessarily 
the most important. The plan as an instrument of purposive 
rationality does not lend itself to revealing the changing, dynamic 
nature of implementation processes. It has been shown hov; it is 
the intentions which underly these formal aspects and which become 
embedded in the plan and how these intentions change over time and 
under different circumstances that become most important. Therefore 
the plan as a "picture in time" becomes part of the process of 
political bargaining providing the technical output of the inter­
actions of intention?decided in the political arena. Thus it 
becomes important to see implementation processes as a series of 
political acts.
The recognition of informal processes represents a much more 
dynamic "implementation structure" (Hjern and Porter 1980) which 
embodies formal and informal relations between individuals and agencies 
which are formed and reformed in response to different needs and 
interests and having an important effect on the flexibility of 
such a s true tin? e.
Thus intentions became part of the action sequence within a 
process of negotiation between officials and members at all levels 
and from external sources resulting in a dominant direction in which
policy and action proceeds.
This interpretation goes a long way to explaining why policy or 
plan inteations may yield different outputs and unintended 
consequences. Snphasis on the control aspects of implementation 
processes may therefore be misdirected in their attempts since most 
of these difficulties cannot be resolved through rational decisions.
Through concentrating on plan performance, the emphasis is 
placed on how action is achieved. Therefore, implementation is not 
seen as a linear, step by step process but interactive and recursive. 
Individuals and organisations actions and reactions may determine 
policy and plans as much as policy and plans themselves determine 
action and response. Therefore, although action can be constrained 
by the context of circumstance, it also presents opportunities for 
entrepreneurial action taking advantage of ’'ideas in good currency” 
(Schon 1971) as in the Maryhill Corriclor Project.
In conclusion the perspective of this research has highlighted 
particular features of implementation processes which need to be 
recognised:
1 the particular organisational and resource requirements available
2 the existence of significant informal processes in achieving
action as well as the formal machinery;
3 the political nature of implementation processes and how they
change through negotiation and bargaining;
^ the reticular and iterative character of decision-making;
3 how the environmental, organisational and political systems
interact and operate;
6 the role of values and ideologies within the political
rationality;
7 the mercurial nature of implementation processes; and
8 the opportunities available for individual action within these
processes.
CHAPTER 6
PLANNING, POLITICS AND IMPLEMENTATION
This concluding chapter attempts to draw together the 
conclusions from the analysis and place them within the theoretical 
positions on planning and implementation discussed in Chapter 1.
Before doing so, and since this reseach is grounded in practise, 
it is necessary to establish reasons for the so called "crisis in 
planning" (Paris and the issues which the practical reality
has raised.
The impact of the economic crisis and the decline of the birth 
rate in the 1970*s, had a profound effect on planning generally and 
within a few years, planning on the basis of anticipated economic 
and demographic growth was transformed into planning for a stable 
population, reduced resources and lowered public expenditure.
At the same time, there was important institutional change.
The re-organisation of local government and the introduction of 
new legislation affecting development plans, land and transport 
policies, presented sudden and disruptive changes. Together with 
changes in the administration and organisation of the new local 
authorities with the introduction of corporate management, to improve 
the awareness of the interrelatedness of policy, both the local and the 
national climate produced a turbulent context.
In part these changes were the result of wider structural 
changes in economic circumstances. Such changes placed considerable 
stress on the ability of planners and planning to adapt to this 
different climate had resulted in criticisms being levelled at the 
planning system;
"the basic problems with the planning process 
are that it promises to do too much, takes 
too long, covers too many problems, is too 
complicated, and produces results that are 
largely vague and esoteric" (A J Catanese 197^1 P ^5)
During the 1970’s, the Royal Town Planning Institute published 
working party papers on growing areas of concern in planning. In 
Planning and the Future (1976), the basic problems were listed as;
1 Delay in preparing plans and duplication;
2 that the planning system was too weak;
3 the lack of connectedness between planners
and the public;
4 the planning system being imperfectly related 
to other local government activity; and
3 the need for the system to be flexible.
The Report went on to say that;
"there is evidence of a growing dissatisfaction 
with planning and this particularly stems from 
the delays, duplication and ineffectiveness of 
the present system". (RTPI 1976 p 4)
Considerable attention has also been paid to the inability of 
plans and policies to be carried out as intended. The recognition 
of the "implementation gap" has resulted in a need to understand 
processes of implementation and planning in greater depth.
"Any notion of policy being invented or 
initiated in some central or high place, to 
be smoothly and painstakingly carried 
out by agents loyal to the spirit and letter of 
that policy, is questionable. T0 expect loyalty 
of that kind from any lower level is clearly 
unrealistic. It does not exist within 
particular agencies, far less between them.
The response, in our view, should not be 
to tighten controls and hope to secure 
greater loyalty to policy intentions.
Rather, we should be seekings ways of 
recognising and harnessing the positive
advantages of these forces which are inevitably 
about planning"(RTPI 1976,p.9)#
It therefore becomes important to look for different ways to understand 
the"effectiveness" of planning. From the analysis of the Corridor 
Project it is clear the formal planning system - the legislation
circulars, statutory plans and procedures - are only one aspect. The
RTPI working party (1976) reinforced this;
"In the past it has been commonly assumed 
that the essential ingredient of the planning
process is the plan or policy and to the
extent that this is not implemented there 
is cause for concern" (RTPI 1976, p 30-31)
From this it can be inferred that less formal processes are 
important involving other interests outside the "technical" planning 
process of the formal system. Development Plans may regulate and 
influence market activities but they do not determine them. The 
problems of the inner city are visible, perhaps obvious, but there 
causes are complex and planners do not possess the power to solve 
them. For some, the lack of control accounts for the non-fulfilment 
of plans where action depends on the decisions taken by a variety of 
bodies. However, the existence of such blighted areas and other 
"irrational" features of the built environment demand an explanation 
that goes beyond assumptions about the failure of planning. It 
requires us to locate planning in its social context.
The difficulties which planning has faced through the 1970*s 
has led some (Healey et al 1982) to conclude that the emphasis on 
getting things done has resulted in a relapse into pragmatism to 
seek an utility for planning. In this sense planners and the planning 
system; are seen as the functionaries of the dominant political 
economy such that planning principles and values become influenced 
by the interests of the dominant pressures surrounding them. This 
emphasises the idea of planning as a political activity where values 
become dependant on the power relationships in society.
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The significance of other less formal ways of approaching the 
planning task and the need to cope with uncertainties has placed 
an emphasis on the role of the planner in responding to and 
developing new opportunities (RTPI 1979)within the prevailing market 
ideology.
The limitation of the "action space" of planners and their 
ability to influence has led to criticisms of the rational - 
comprehensive approach which has characterised planning since the 
post-war period.
The rational-comprehensive paradigm, it was suggested, sees 
the planning process in technical terms separating means and ends 
and placing an emphasis on controlling the v a r i o u s  forces which affect 
the planning process such that "policy implementation encompasses those 
actions by public and private bodies, that are directed at the 
achievement of objections selt forth in prior policy decisions (Van 
Meter, Van Horn p M+5-88). Therefore, "a plan is a course of 
action which can be carried into effect, which can be expected to 
lead to the attainment of the ends sought, and which someone (the 
effecting organisation) intends to carry into effect". (Meyerson 
and Banfield 196*t, p 312).
It is the use which is made bf plans, however, which is 
important rather than their explicit content as such (E Preteceille 
1982, p 1^5). Plans and policies cannot be regarded as constants 
since they are mediated in implementation by actors operating within 
different "assumptive worlds" from those formulating policy. Plans 
have to satisfy a multitude of interests such that conflicts are 
likely to occur not only within the power structure of government 
but within the specific organisational "set-up". Plans, therefore, 
have little control over implementation and further that:
"The political reality is that general 
public interests are almost impossible to 
define articulate" (Catanese p 25, 197/+).
Much of the concern for the planning system has concentrated on 
the assumption that plans need to be flexible enough to adapt to 
changing circumstances. However, in this analysis, interests and 
intentions play the central part in a multi-organisational context 
mediated through the political arena such that the emphasis moves 
away from the "technical" planning process to an emphasis on the 
factors which achieve action.
The inability of planning to "deliver the goods" has been 
highlighted by Wildavsky in his article "If planning is everything 
maybe its nothing" (Wildavsky 1973), in which he states that what is 
called planning is in fact indistinguishable from unplanned decision­
making and, in terms of principle, therefore, is unlikely to achieve 
the results which planners claim for it. The assumption is that in 
order to make planning intellectually credible, it has to be able 
to control events and future uncertainties.
Wildavsky comments on the contention that no superior, planning 
process exists which allows planners to have a monopoly in decisions, 
based on technical knowledge. Thus while accepting the existence 
of a planning process, such a process is not distinctive, such that 
it becomes part of a number of planning processes which are subdued with­
in the wider political rationality. In effect, therefore, the 
rational, comprehensive approach becomes misdirected in attempting 
to develop increasingly sophisticated normative models which exclude 
the significance of governmental action and the "political" aspects 
of interpersonal and interagency relations which are crucial in 
explaining policy outcomes or understanding implementation processes.
The apolitical nature of the rational approach suggests the 
traditional claim of neutrality of planners and thus avoiding 
questions of conflict. Exponents of the policy-oriented approach 
emphasise the need for consensus on human needs and that social 
priorities can be rationally debated. In reality, however, many 
planners recognise and act within the sphere of politics, acknowledg­
ing political support in order to get things done.
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The Development Plan for Maryhill and the subsequent changes 
to it were seen to be the outcome of a bargaining process in the 
political arena from the interactions of politicians, officials etc. 
Assuming the constraints on the planners ’'action space", in attempting 
to increase their influence, they adopt principles which are likely 
to be acceptable to those they seek to influence (Healey and 
Underwood 1978). This raises the issue of the utility of planning 
as a state activity guided by the dominant political and economic 
climate and this, together with the uncertainty of future circumstances 
and the variability of interests involved conflicts with the 
apparent autonomy of planners in the managerialist thesis 
(Pahl 1970).
Blowers (9180) comments that, "There is little control by 
planning over instruments required to achieve planning objectives, 
and considerable dependence on a multiplicity of agencies, public 
and private, to secure the effective implementation of plans" (P2)
Friedmann (1973) suggests that it is only in a situation of 
stability and clarity that the rational-comprehensive approach 
would actually work, ^he latter approach, advocated by supporters 
of "systems approach" (McLaughlin 1973» Stewart 1971) would see 
the process of putting policy into effect as;
1 the availability of required resources;
2 the ability to control resources; and
3 communicating what is wanted.
It therefore becomes relatively easy to place the reasons for 
conflicts on the problems of bureaucracy, seen as a generic whole 
and the response seen in terms of providing controls, incentives 
etc. However, as Blowers (1980) suggests;
"it is important to perceive and articulate 
the political conflicts, concealed and 
overt, for it is here that the 
signficance of planning as a means of
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influencing the lives of individuals 
lies1' (p 1®9)
The planning process in therefore not a unitary, logical 
sequential process integrating means-ends relationships in 
accordance with rational comprehensibility. The process is characterised 
by highly complex interactions of different intentions and objectives, 
at different levels in a reticular decision-making process, within the 
context of dynamic processes affecting the context of circumstances.
Thus, one time salutary development such as urban motorways and high- 
rise flats, have under different conditions been characterised as 
opprobrious, The Maryhill Corridor Project and the developments 
within it were affected by changes in conditions, perpetuated by 
changes in intentions and aims of different parties highlighting 
the relative nature of "effectiveness", in planning.
In practise much of what does take place, as in the Corridor 
Project, tends to be characterised by Lindblom's "disjointed 
incrementalism", to which the response of the rationalist "recipe- 
book" approach would be misdirected. Incrementalists urge the 
avoidence of Utopianism since it involves high risks, and both goals 
and means toattain objectives are unclear. Utopian approaches, 
however, can stimulate the imagination into long run thinking. There 
is a tendency for incrementalists to neglect the unimportant 
consequences of policy, but among those they concede to be unimportant 
they rule out of bounds the uninteresting, the remote, the imponderable, 
the intangible and the poorly understood, no matter how important.
It therefore represents a process of adaptation and amelioration, 
recognising "ills" to move away from rather than goals towards which 
to move. (Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963, p 9* P 102).
Hambleton (1978) comments of disjointed incrementalism that 
analyses and evaluation are disjointed in the sense that various 
aspects of public policy and even aspects of any one problem area are 
analysed at various points, with no apparent co-ordination and without 
the articulation of points that ideally denotes subdivisions of topic 
in synoptic problem-solving (pp 105-6), suggesting that such a strategy
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is no strategy at all, Donnison (1975) contends that Lindblora's 
pluralist conception generally pictures society as it actually is, 
but critises it in asserting that to go a step further and argue 
that such a strategy is good (p 31) is another matter and leads 
Eddison to comment that to advocate incrementalism is to 
"unwittingly buttress complacency" (Eddison 1975)»
Nevertheless, in practise planning has been less concerned to 
initiate proposals which lead to desired (normative) outcomes than 
to react to circumstances and attempt to rationalise outcomes in 
terms of some co-ordinated framework. In this respect it becomes 
difficult to disscern the difference between planning and incrementalism
Nevertheless, the emphasis on the behavioural approach high­
lights the "political" suspects of planning and implementation and 
the considerable influence these factors have on planning and 
action such that plsinning hsus deceived itself by evading the 
realities of uncertainty about the future of change, and the role 
of the planner within this environment (Eddison 1975)• Thus the 
conceptualisation of the plsinning process should not be seen as a 
pathology to be cured but a reality to be faced (Friedmann 1975)#
Part of the logic of this perspective places the understanding 
of planning and therefore of implementation firmly within the context
a
of social processes in general, y recognising planning sis an activity 
per se rather than a discrete technical, process it becomes possible 
to concentrate on the "action" and how this fits in with the dynamic 
processes of implementation discussed earlier. This style of 
"innovative planning" has been developed through the New Humanist 
tradition:
"In Innovative planning, different 
kinds of technical experts apply 
their skills directly to the development 
of new orgainsational responses to the 
needs perceived. Rather than preparing
elaborate proposals that are preliminaries 
to action, they achieve a fusion of 
plan-making with plan implementation 
activities during the course of the 
action itself. In (Innovative) Planning 
plans and action become conterminous"
(Friedmann 1973. in Hambleton (1978) (p 286))
It is important that the above represents a move away from 
seeing the process of plan-making as central to the process of 
planning. Implementation then becomes less the automatic process 
of policy execution and more an arena for political bargaining in 
the deployment of financial, management, information and other 
resources.
In the 1970's the shift in local government and indeed central 
government practise towards the adoption of more corporate 
approaches to policy-making represented the growing acceptance of 
the need for more "rational" approaches. At the same time there 
was also concern over the ability of government to use these new 
approaches;
"Government, whether rational, regional or 
local, appears to be adept at making 
statements of intentions, but what happens 
on the ground often falls a long way 
short of the original aspirations".••
Government either seems unable to put 
its policy into effect as intended or 
finds that its interventions and action 
have unexpected or counter-productive 
outcomes which create new problems".
(Barret and Fudge (1981) p 3)«
It has been argued that government is trying to influence and 
control much more than it has the material or political resources 
to achieve. In turn, ineffectiveness has been seen in terms of
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inefficiency and incompetence. However, within this perspective 
there is a tendency to play down issues of power relations, the 
complexity of interests and value systems between individuals and 
agencies who make policy and those who put it into action. In this 
sense the processes of negotiation and compromise become prerequisites 
to the interaction of agencies and actors involved. Plans and action 
therefore interact and are no longer separate, and where the emphasis 
is placed on achieving action and making things happen between those 
involved, precipitating processes of political bargaining.
In accepting this perspective, the introduction of more rational 
approaches such as corporate management and simpler management structures 
(as in the Corridor Project) cannot make one sanguine about their 
ability to subdue departmentalism nor in making things happen quicker 
since such procedures themselves are not simply the outcome of 
co-operation and communication but of overt and covert bargaining 
and which marked the success performance of the Corridor Project .
When the Bains and Paterson Reports were produced they were asserting 
the predominance of a management system which depoliticised elected 
members, and encouraged them to identify with the organisation to 
become "co-opted as a kind of administrator into official decision­
making" (DM Hill 197^i p 87)
So often, corporate planning has concealed the politics of
implementation leading Hambleton and Eddison to suggest the need to
use corporate management to open it up in new directions such that 
values, conflicts of interest and a plurality of objectives are 
given to councillors".
This analysis raises the issue of "effectiveness" as a relative 
concept. The current relationships between central and local 
government are not designed to allow local authorities to learn for
itself. Tight monetary controls and constraints on action sire
agreed to regulation rather than spurring new initiatives, contrary 
to the initial environment in which the new rationed, approaches were 
developed.
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The major conclusion of this research has been the significance 
of the political rationality in affecting action. It is suggested 
that by focusing on the important links between politics and 
administration, one can reveal much more of the theory and practice 
of plsinning which is the central concern of this study.
An implementation perspective does not just focus on action, 
reaction, or response, where the nature of organisations and their 
behaviour influences the differential scope for action and the use 
made of this "action space" within a particular project. It also 
focuses on the politics of policy;
"it is indeed because the policy section is 
so diffuse, so all embracing, and so 
opaque that it is the implementation 
process which sheds light on the 
politics of the policy and on the values 
and purpose which underlie the policy"
(Stewart and Underwood 1982 p 219)
In effect the processes of implementation become central to the 
analysis of planning as an activity lying at an important interface 
involving the interaction of a complexity of interests and intentions 
and their resultant manifestations in the field of public policy*
It is within this blurred, essentially political arena that the 
planners role can be developed.
Thus, in order to avoid the relapse into pragmatism, sis well 
as recognising the significance of politicial bargaining, one must 
also recognise the opportunities for administrative lesirning. From 
the planner's ability to "innovate" in understanding what is 
policically feasible as well as rationally defensible i opportunities 
exist to develop a hightened awscreness of the chasm between knowledge 
and action.
This research accepts the need to understand action within the
orgainisational and administrative structures that exist which 
themselves are part of the wider social processes of societal 
development. It, therefore, becomes important to attempt to bring 
together the micro-level processes, which have been the subject matter 
of this thesis, and those at the macro-level and by doing so help 
to reveal the processes governing planning and its practice and thus 
help to understand implementation processes within the epistemology of 
planning.
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APPENDIX 1
TABLE OF EVENTS
P L A N N I N G  AND  
M A NA GE ME N T
MARYHILL P O L I T I C S EXT  ER N A L
1960's Glasgow Corporation Quinquennial ' 
Review
Designation of Comprehensive 
Development Areas
Greater Glasgow Transportation 
Study •
Woodside
(Comprehensive Development Area) 
Maryhill
(Outline Comprehensive Development 
Area)
Maryhill Motorway
Glasgow Corporation (Labour) Central Government subsidies 
available for capital programmes 
Planning Advisory Group - Review of 
Development Plans. (1965)
Commission for Local Government 
Re-organisation.
Housing Act (1969).
1972 Glasgow Corporation; "Area3 of 
Need"
Report
Bains Report on management in Local
Authorities for England and Wales.
Peter Walker (Environment Secretary) 
calls for "total approach".
Town and Country Planning (Scotland) 
Act 1972.
1973 Local Government Re-Organisation 
(Scotland) 1973.
Paterson Report (Scotland) 1973.
1974 West Central Scotland Plan - 
comprehensive approach
Maryhill Corridor District Study
(Glasgow Corporation Planning Dept)
Elections for new Regional 
and District Councils.
Housing Act (Scotland) 1974
Move from Redevelopment to 
Rehavilitation.
1975 Designation of Priority Areas, 
including Maryhill, by Glasgow 
Corporation
Re-organisation of Local Government
Adoption of Corporate Management; 
Officer/Member Groups (Strathclyde 
Region)
Kelvin Local Plan begins.
Summerston under construction.
Summerston Housing Co-operative.
Growing public opinion against 
Motorway.
Strathclyde Regional Council 
(Labour)
Glasgow District Council 
(Labour)
Introduction of Community Councils 
Regional Councillors for Maryhill 
against Motorway
Scottish Development Agency 
(Scotland) Act 1975.
S Holtermann (DOE) - Deprivation 
Study
Housing Rents and Subsidies 
(Scotland) Act 1975.
Introduction of Central Government 
expenditure cuts.
1976 Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) 
Strathclyde Regional Council - 
Survey and Issues Report;
Multiple Deprivation "Red Book"; 
Areas of Need Report.
Maryhill Corridor Working Party, 
(Glasgow District Council). ,
Queens Cross Housing Association 
formed.
Maryhill Housing Association. 
Shelving of Maryhill Motorway
Maryhill Motorway deleted from 
Regional Council's Capital 
Transport Programme.
Scottish Office Programme 
announced for East End of Glasgow
Bi*uc'e Millan-Secretary of State 
for Scotland
Augmented Urban Programme.
1977 Strathclyde Region - 
Area Initiatives; Introduction of 
Area Management Teams and 
Co-ordinators
Glasgow District-Proposal for 
Policy Co-Ordination Unit.
Announcement of forthcoming project 
for Maryhill (pre-elections).
John Gray (North-Kelvinside; Regional 
Councillor) appointed as , 
Policy and Rescources Representative.
District Council Elections - 
minority Conservative administr­
ation .
Labour losses 20 seats ' 
Meeting at Scottish Office with 
Strathclyde Region and Glasgow 
District.
White paper on Inner Cities by 
Peter Shore (Environment Secretary) 
Chancellor Dennis Healey- 2nd budget 
(extra resources for inner cities) 
Urban Aid 
GEAR starts.
1978 Maryhill Corridor Project/Capital 
Programme.
Kelvin Local Plan adopted, 
Maryhill Local Plan begins 
Local Plan working parties formed
Region Co-ordinator appointed. 
District Co-ordinator appointed.
Working parties formed for local 
plans.
Area management team/Corridor 
Working Party.
TTo-ordinating Committee (District) 
approve Maryhill Corridor Project 
Regional Council approves Projects 
as one of Area Initiatives. 
Commitment to private housing 
(District). Housing Core group 
formed. Transfer of expenditure 
on housing to peripheral estates
Inner Urban Areas Act
1979 Redevelopment Assistance Programme
Development Plan for Maryhill; 
Maryhill Corridor Project Annual 
Report (Region).
Greater emphasis on industry and 
employment (District).
Community Work Management Group. 
Commerce and Industry Group. 
Demolition Group
Worthington Report (Region) on 
community development.
Meeting with SSHA, Glasgow District 
and Scottish Office resulting in 
Redevelopment Assistance Programme 
Conservatives resign Glasgow-Labour 
take control.
General Election-Conservative 
Government elected.
Increase in public expenditure 
cuts
George Younger-Secretary of State 
for Scotland.
1980 Divisional Deprivation Grasps (Region
Area Management introduced (District
Adoption of "alternative strategy" 
(Glasgow District Council). 
District Co-ordinutor leaves. 
Review of Management Arrangements
Glasgow Divisional Deprivation 
Group.
North West Area Management Team.
Richard Davies chairs working 
part (District).
Science Park proposed (SDA). 
Growth of Community Groups
District Council Elections-Labour 
Majority.
Concern for peripheral estates 
Competition between areas for 
resources.
Maryhill councillors on Housing 
Core Group (District)
\
1981 Maryhill Local Plan adopted 
Institute for Operational Resouroh- 
Evaluation of Area Initiatives
Housing associations take on 
greater role ie. Scottish Special 
Queens Cross and Maryhill
GEAR remains top priority. 
Re-uffirmation of commitment to 
Maryhill (District)
Scottish Development Department 
Circular 7/81 on Urban Aid 
applications.
(Regional Council).
Region's Co-ordinator leaves 
Re-organisation of Urban Aid 
applications.
Community Projects more important. Political representation on 
councillors on Working Party.
Increasing expenditure cuts on 
local authorities.
1982 Area Profiles-Region Council
Appointment of Joint Co-ordinator 
Richard Davies (District Employee).
Social Strategy for the 80's (Regicn)
Community Work Management Group 
disbanded.
Regional Council earmarks other 
priority areas ie. peripheral 
estates.
Emphasis on voluntary and private 
sectors.
1983 Social Deprivation in Glasgow 
Report-Glasgow District Council 
Planning department.
Redefinement of area management 
boundaries (District)
Region retains area managemtn team
Greater competition for Urban Aid 
between community Groups
Commerce and Industry Group more 
significant.
Rate-capping proposed.
Public expenditure cuts affecting 
Rate Support Grant, Housing 
Revenue Accounts etc.
1984 Joint Co-ordinator leaves. 
District Council input through 
North West Area Management Team. 
Area Management Tean (Region) 
managed through appointee from 
Social Work Department.
Deprioritisation of Maryhill
Changes in ward boundaries
Forthcoming Initiative for 
Peripheral Estates (Regional and 
District Councils):
APPENDIX 2
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
Colin Bond
Gordon Brown
Jim Craigen MP
Baillie Daniel Crawford
Richard Davies
John Gray
Lord Provost 
Robert Gray
Barbara Jeffrey
Stewart Logan
Mrs B McCanny 
Malcolm McDonald
Lawrence McGarry
Felicity McLelland
David McLennan
Helen Monro
James Muir
Scottish Development Agency; Manager 
of Science Park
Greater Glasgow Health Board
Member of Parliament for Maryhill
Glasgow District Councillor for 
North Kelvin
Joint Co-ordinator (1982-84). 
Co-ordinator for North West Area 
Management Team
Strathclyde Regional Councillor for 
Nroth Kelvin
City of Glasgow; Glasgow District 
Councillor for Maryhill
Community Council Resource Centre
Estates Department, Glasgow District 
Council
Maryhill Community Central Hall
Lecturer in Planning, Glasgow School 
of Act
Strathclyde Regional Councillor for 
Maryhill and Summerston
Social Work Department, Strathclyde 
Regional Council
Housing Manager (North Area), Glasgow 
District Council
Community Education, Strathclyde 
Regional Council
Roads Department, Strathclyde Regional 
Council
Stewart Murdoch Development Officer, Maryhill 
Community Central Hall
List of interviewees 
Robert Parry
Douglas Stonelake 
Anthony Tobia 
Hugh Todd 
Douglas Veitch 
David Watts 
James Wintour
cont'd
Regional Co-ordinator (1978-81)
Chief Executive's Department,
Strathclyde Regional Council
Architect, Scottish Special Housing 
Association
Physical Planning Department, Strathclyde 
Regional Council
Gairbraid Community Education Centre, 
Strathclyde Regional Council
Planning Department, Glasgow District 
Council
Economic Planning, Glasgow District 
Council
Queens Cross Housing Association
I am indebted to the above for their co-operation in the development 
of this research and for contributing to discussion on many of the 
points raised in this thesis.
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